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Welcoming Monsters: Disability as a
Liminal Legal Concept
Jonas-S~bastien Beaudry*
"One morning, I got up to shave, as usual, and instead of a hair, there
was a feather on my face."
"Well, it's normal for a crow to have feathers. However what's less
normal is to shave if you have feathers."
"But I wasn't a crow before, I was a normal being like you..."'
The philosophy of disability has burgeoned into a field of its own. Like
the general field of disability studies, it hosts a multiplicity of schools,
expertise and methodologies. It is unified, if at all, by a desire for the
social integration of people perceived or understood to be "different",
mentally or physically. This article aims to orient the reader within the
field of the philosophy of disability and present some important lessons
that it can teach legal actors.
The task of achieving social integration for people with disabilities
(PWD) and other minority groups has often been presented under the
political idiom of equality. Philosophers have contributed to this endeavor,
both within and outside of law schools, by problematizing the meaning
and normative implications of equality. Philosophers of disability, in
particular, have empowered disability activists with egalitarian arguments
utilizing notions of oppression, dignity and substantive equality. However,
the field of the philosophy of disability is not only divided by the question
of "what is equality and how to best achieve it?" but also by the more
fundamental question of "what is social integration and how to best
achieve it?" While egalitarian answers to that question may hold greater
purchase in our current legal culture, I will consider other promising
answers that draw from beyond the confines of liberalism in this article,
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and sketch the distinctive subversive potential of the philosophy of
disability.
This article is divided into four parts. Part one surveys the field of the
philosophy of disability, tracing it back to its activist origins and
presenting some of the main tensions within it.
Part two unpacks three themes found in writings in the wake of the work
of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida: the notion of the "monstrous,"
normalization, and the principle of "limitless welcome". Using primarily
the work of Anita Silvers and of Margrit Shildrick, two influential
philosophers of disability working respectively inside and outside 'of the
liberal paradigm, I relate post-structuralist descriptive and normative
claims to similarly subversive ideas existing within liberal political theory
informing mainstream legal scholarship. I argue that liberal legal and
political theory may well adopt certain (versions of) Foucauldian and
Derridean lessons without abandoning their traditional commitments. As
such, this essay illustrates the kind of translation work that can take place
within the interdisciplinary field of disability studies so that its diversity
does not become Babelian. This is especially desirable since those
imported concepts yield significant emancipatory potential.
In Part three, I nonetheless recognize the inherently extra-legal nature of
certain critical tools and ideals put forward by Foucault and Derrida, and I
note why liberal structures and the people inhabiting them would resist its
profoundly threatening impact. I also acknowledge that they cannot be
operationalized like other concepts used in emancipatory struggles (such
as "rights"). They may still inform the ethical dispositions that legal actors
should endorse towards disability.
In Part four, I illustrate how mainstream legal discourses do not
necessarily shy away from ideals simply because they are unattainable or
because both their shape and the means to pursue them evolve along with
our culture and the power dynamics within it.
While "disability" is typically utilized in the law as opening paths to
welfare benefits on a medical basis or as a prohibited ground of
discrimination (e.g. under human rights legislations), it also has the radical
and subversive potential to be understood as a liminal legal concept that
liberals can integrate into their emancipatory toolkit.
By "liminal legal concept", I refer to a concept the boundaries of which
are to be negotiated within a proto-legal discursive space where jurists
imagine and define new configurations of law and policy. The term
"liminality" has long been used by anthropologists to refer to an in-
between state where individuals have not yet completed a ritual through
which they will change. 2 I use the term "liminal" because it captures one
2. VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE (1969).
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of the key characteristics of the normative and descriptive notions related
to disability I examine in this article. This characteristic is that the concept
of disability can be used as a critical tool at the periphery of the law, that
is, before it is operationalized into enforceable norms and inevitably runs
the risk of losing touch with its raison d'etre. In the case of "disability",
this raison d'etre is arguably to welcome and include, rather than to
ostracize or assimilate.
Enquiries into legal concepts in a liminal state examine how extra-legal
factors mould legal decrees. A great number of concepts could be
analyzed during their transition toward concrete legal formulations, just
like they could be analyzed through positivist or social lenses. However,
social justice scholars will probably find that legal concepts defining
subjects and their entitlements, or connected to historically oppressed or
"vulnerable" identities, are particularly fecund sites of analysis in their
liminal-legal stage.3 This is because disability, like race and gender, is a
concept that is deceptively taken for granted once it formally belongs to
the legal realm.
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DISABILITY: A SURVEY
As many recent books and anthologies indicate,' the phenomenon of
3. Consider, for instance, the notion of "sexual harassment", that was not a legal variety of sex
discrimination before the 70s, and came into legal existence by "transiting through" a social process
including activism and litigation. This approach can be used to criticize a certain legal category or
apparatus. Consider Amy Adler's criticism of how "censorship law respond[ed] and shap[ed] a
cultural crisis [of child sexual abuse and child pornography]" by creating a legal framework that
"threatens to enslave us all, by constructing a world in which we are enthralled - anguished, enticed,
bombarded - but the spectacle of the sexual child". Adler examines the disturbing hypothesis that
prohibition invites transgression, id es, that the particular way in which the law has prohibited child
pornography both masks and sustains repressed pedophilic desires. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of
Child Pornogaphy, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 245 (2001). The definition of disability in law is
controversial, and various legal actors (judges, legislators, activists) participate to its evolution. Like
the two aforementioned examples (sexual harassment and child pornography), its use as legal category
intends to produce a beneficial outcome. However, such legal discourses may, inadvertently and well-
meaningly, become complicit in the creation of a "disabled subject" who must be cast in negative
ways (notably, as being naturally unable, burdensome or unfortunate) in order to justify protective or
supportive regimes.
4. The following titles are by no means an exhaustive bibliography, but an illustration of some of
the remarkable works in the philosophy of disability to have appeared in the last decade:
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY (PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE) (D. Christopher Ralston
& Justin Ho eds., 2010); COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY, (Eva
Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds., 2010); DISABILITY AND DISADVANTAGE, (Kimberley Brownlee &
Adam Cureton eds., 2009); CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds.,
2006); LICIA CARLSON, THE FACES OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
(2009); FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY, (Shelley Tremain ed., 2006);
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: ETHICS, DEHUMANIZATION AND A NEW MORAL COMMUNITY, (Heather
Keith & Kenneth D. Keith eds., 2012); DISABILITY AND THE GOOD HUMAN LIFE (Jerome Bickenbach,
Franziska Felder & Barbara Schmitz eds., 2014); TOBIN ANTHONY SIEBERS, DISABILITY THEORY
(2008); ELIZABETH BARNES, THE MINORITY BODY (2016); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE, (2007); ARGUING ABOUT DISABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Kristjana Kristiansen,
Simo Vehmas & Tom Shakespeare eds., 2008). Consider, also, the launch of a new series specialized
in disability within university presses, such as the Disability Law and Policy Series at Cambridge
University Press; Critical Perspectives on Disability at Syracuse University Press; or the Disability
3
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disability has gained unprecedented attention within the philosophical
community in the last decade. This is not to say that philosophers were not
concerned with disability prior to the twenty-first century. Scholars like
Adrienne Asch, Jerome Bickenbach, Eva F. Kittay, Anita Silvers, David
Wasserman and Susan Wendell' made influential contributions to the
philosophy of disability in the 90s. Disability, however, is not an ancient
philosophical topic like law or war because, unlike those concepts, the
notion of disability, as it is currently understood, did not exist until the rise
of statistical science and the use of notions like normality and deviance in
political agendas concerning public health in the 19th century.6 Of course,
phenomena that are commonly called "disabilities" have always existed
(e.g. Down syndrome, blindness) but the concept of "disability" includes
socially constructed elements that cannot be reduced to merely
physiological traits. It is those socially constructed elements, instead of
the strictly physiological aspects of "disability", that have been of great
recent philosophical interest.
The currently blossoming philosophy of disability, like the philosophy
of race or gender, is rooted in injustice. Theories of disability in the 70s
and the 80s were found in the activist and sociological work that
constituted a delayed response to the segregation of PWD in asylums and
workhouses which became widespread during the nineteenth century.
Until that point, segregation had been the principal way of managing those
individuals who were incapable of adjusting to the individualized and
competitive modes of production of the social order established by the
industrial revolution. The view that "disability" is a socially engineered
situation in which one finds herself and not merely a medical condition or
a biological abnormality is indebted to the pioneering work of sociologists
like Saad Nagi7 and Mike Oliver.
Because disability studies is characterized by its interdisciplinary
character, it would be artificial to deny the intellectual proximity of certain
fields (e.g. anthropology or sociology of disability) to the philosophy of
disability. Two foundational lines of inquiry about disability which cut
across disciplines were (1) a social constructivist outlook, early versions
Culture and Politics Series at University ofBritish Columbia Press.
5. WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS (Michelle
Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988); JEROME BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1993); EVA KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR (1999); ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN & MARY B.
MAHOWALD, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1999); SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY (1997).
6. LENNARD DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY ch.2 (1995); IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF
CHANCE ch.20 (1990).
7. Saad Nagi, Some Conceptual Issues in Disability and Rehabilitation, IN SOCIOLOGY AND
REHABILITATION 100 (Marvin B. Sussman ed., 1965).
8. MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT (1990).
294 [Vol. 29:2
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of which held that human beings are "unfinished" creatures, in the sense
that we must supplement our "instinctual world" with a cultural one, and
our biology with social determinants 9 and (2) a concern for the interrelated
psychological and social mechanisms of power, stigma and oppression
(respectively theorized, for instance, in the seminal work of Michel
Foucault, 1o Erving Goffman, " and Mike Oliverl 2 ). Both clusters can
inform the work of philosophers of justice and equality. The former sheds
light on the complex claim that disability is at least partly socially
constructed which, in turn, has repercussions on the allocation of
responsibility to respond to situations of disability, as well as on the
determination of what constitutes a proper "response" to disability. The
latter equips disability activists with a rich language to articulate why
PWD are victimized by prejudice rather than fate. Moral and legal claims
can then be articulated as a demand for redress, similar to other oppressed
minorities, rather than as a plea for charity. (This traditional plea, in
contrast, would only provide PWD a right to medical treatment on the
basis that they should not be held responsible for having drawn a short
genetic straw or undergone a disease or an accident resulting in disability
through no fault of their own).
Other theorists whose contributions to disability studies profoundly
shaped the philosophy of disability include activists demanding social
integration, such as Vic Finkelstein, who shares the paternity of the "social
model of disability" with Mike Oliver. 13 Finkelstein was also the co-
founder of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS), a UK disability group whose "fundamental principles",
published in 1976, describe the soul of the social model:
[I]t is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is
something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society.
[...] Poverty is one symptom of our oppression, but it is not the cause
[...] We shall clearly get nowhere if our efforts are chiefly directed
not at the cause of our oppression, but instead at one of the
symptoms. 14
9. Bryan Turner, Disability and the Sociology of the Body, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY
STUDIES, 256 (L. Albrecht, Katherine Seelman, & Michael Bury eds., 2003). Among the views
considered by Turner, the most influential one is probably that of BERGER, P. & T. LUCKMANN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1967).
10. MICHEL FOUCAULT, LES ANORMAUX, COURS AU COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1974-1975 (1999);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTOIRE DE LA FOLIE A L'AGE CLASSIQUE (1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
NAISSANCE DE LA CLINIQUE, (1963).
11. ERVINGGOFFMAN, STIGMA (1963).
12. MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (1996).
13. VIC FINKELSTEIN, ATTITUDES AND DISABLED PEOPLE (1980).
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While the UK's brand of activism and disability theory was partly
informed by Marxist and working class ideals, the American "Independent
Living Movement" reflected the individualist brand of liberalism
dominating North American culture by emphasizing how PWD could
become independent citizens and consumers (of disability goods and
services), through deinstitutionalization and a contentious rehabilitation
into a capitalist social structure."
In addition to sociologists and activists, persons with disabilities, with
or without a philosophical background, such as Susan Wendell, 16 Robert
Murphy, 1 Irving Zola, 18 and Jenny Morris 19 have produced
autobiographical narratives that bring subjective experiences to the
forefront of theoretical reflections about disability. Such approaches fed
phenomenological and feminist analyses of disability, just like Oliver and
Finkelstein helped political philosophers reconceptualize equality claims
with regard to disability. Such subjective takes on disability were
sometimes perceived as clashing with social ones, since the "social
model" of disability wanted to emphasize external, environmental barriers
to social integration rather than subjective experiences of impairments. In
spite of these and other tensions between disability discourses, those
subjective narratives undeniably enriched the philosophy of disability by
illuminating how disability may inform one's identity, how it is a way to
be in one's body, how it is to relate to differently embodied beings, and
how it is to live in a world built for "normal" bodies. Moreover, narratives
of disability as subjectively experienced and descriptions of disability as
social oppression need not clash; they may, on the contrary, inform each
other. As anthropologist Robert Murphy wrote in his autopathography:
This is . . . the history of the impact of a quite remarkable illness
upon my status as a member of society, for it has visited upon me a
disease of social relations no less real than the paralysis of the body.20
While it is hard to uncontroversially trace the evolution of such a motley
field, a plausible description is that the philosophy of disability grew out
of the concerns of activists. There is historical precedent for this
intellectual chronology: other groups (e.g. women, LGBT, African
15. For a survey of disability models, see COLIN BARNES & GEOF MERCER, EXPLORING
DISABILITY, (2010); Barbara Altman, Disability Definitions, Models, Classification Schemes, and
Applications, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 97 (L. Albrecht, Katherine Seelman, & Michael
Bury eds., 2003); J. BICKENBACH PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1993) and J.
BICKENBACH, ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY (2012).
16. WENDELL, supra note 5.
17. ROBERT MURPHY, THE BODY SILENT (1990).
18. IRVING ZOLA, MISSING PIECES: A CHRONICLE OF LIVING WITH A DISABILITY (2003).
19. JENNY MORRIS, PRIDE AGAINST PREJUDICE (1991).
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Americans) also made simultaneous progress on both practical and
theoretical fronts. As civil rights struggles became a topic of philosophical
research, their theorization also became increasingly abstract, including
attempts to not only understand notions like gender, race, sex and
disability, but also to genealogize and deconstruct them. 21 The philosophy
of disability has also increasingly benefited from the criticism of
liberalism and autonomy found in the fields of feminist and queer studies.
Those exchanges shed light on core concerns from each fields and allow
for intersectional analysis.22 Cultural studies also intersect with disability
studies through the influential work of Garland-Thompson and Lennart
Davis, both English professors, which illustrates how cultural studies has
the potential to clarify foundational concepts analyzed within the
philosophy of disability (in their case, especially that of normalcy).23
Views of disability that deconstruct, genealogize or criticize the
"disabled identity" instead of making use of it within political struggles
could be considered to fall within a broad "second wave" of disability
theory. By contrast, the first wave is characterized by a reappropriation of
a "disabled identity" within social struggles for recognition. "Second
wave" disability theorists problematize the nature and political or legal
uses of such an identity.
Some of these "second wave" views caused a backlash within the
disability movement. "Old school" disability theorists worried that the
newer disability theory wave was losing sight of its activist roots and goals
and betraying, to use some of those scholars severe terms, the very people
they were ultimately supposed to help and on the back of whom many
academic reputations were built.24
In a nutshell, traditional social modellists were concerned that
challenging the very notion of "disabled person" as an identity would
undermine its political use that had so far proven helpful in times of
economic scarcity. Others criticized those later (post-modern)
philosophical strands for being too obscure for the non-initiated and hard
21. See, e.g., DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY: EMBODYING DISABILITY THEORY (Mairian Corker &
Tom Shakespeare eds., 2002); DAVID T. MITCHELL WITH SHARON L. SNYDER, THE BIOPOLITICS OF
DISABILITY: NEOLIBERALISM, ABLENATIONALISM, AND PERIPHERAL EMBODIMENT (2015).
22. ALISON KAFER, FEMINIST, QUEER, CRIP (2013); FEMINIST DISABILITY STUDIES (Kim Q. Hall
ed., 2011); SEX AND DISABILITY (Robert McRuer & Anna Mollow ed., 2012). Robert McRuer
reported being told by Rosemarie Garland-Thompson on their way to a meeting on AIDS cultural
theory in 1988, "You know, this is disability studies": ROBERT MCRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL
SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY, xiii (2006).
23. Among their various publications, it would seem fair to count the following two books as part
of the core canon of disability studies courses: LENNARD DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY (1995);
ROSEMARY GARLAND-THOMPSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES (1996). See also MICHAEL BIRUBE,
LIFE AS WE KNOW IT: A FATHER, A FAMILY, AND AN EXCEPTIONAL CHILD (1996).
24. See, e.g., Colin Barnes, Disability Studies and the Academy - Past, Present and Future, 4 ARS
VIVENDI 3,12 (2013); Mike Oliver, The Social Model ofDisability: Thirty Years On, 28:7 DISABILITY
& SOC'Y 1024, 1026 (2013).
2017]1 297
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to operationalize.25
It may be said, in reply, that some (second-wave) theorists are test-
driving the normative language of tomorrow and criticizing today's
discourses that regulate and construct disability while some others
pragmatically focus on the political idiom currently endorsed by law and
policy. One should also mention that many of the aforementioned authors
are either themselves disabled (indeed, some chronicled their own
experiences) or have family members who are. The emergence of the
philosophy of disability is, in part, an academic reclamation by scholars
closely involved with disability of a field of knowledge previously
appropriated and occupied by the able-bodied, in line with the disability
movement's motto, "Nothing About Us Without Us". The field of
disability philosophy would not only ensure the streamlining of
"disability" as a worthwhile, distinct, philosophical object of research, but
also that PWD remain the authors of such research, as self-understanding
subjects. Consider the Society for Disability and Philosophy, whose
constitution ratified in 2012 stipulates the dual purpose of "furthering
research and teaching on philosophical issues related to disability" and of
"promoting inclusiveness and support for people with disabilities in
philosophical education and in the profession of philosophy." 2 6
The appropriation of this field of knowledge by its "object" did not only
take it away from the hands of scientists, but also of able-bodied
philosophers who previously occupied much of whatever space could be
called "philosophy of disability". They included utilitarian philosophers,
like Peter Singer, who compared animals and intellectually impaired
persons in order to reveal our callousness toward animals, as well as Helga
Kuhse, with whom Singer has argued in favor of abortion and infanticide
of PWD under specific circumstances. 27 As Susan Wendell writes, when
she herself became disabled and started reflecting philosophically on her
newfound embodiment:
I consulted The Philosopher's Index, looking under "Disability,"
"Handicap," "Illness," and "Disease". This was a depressing
experience. At least 90% of philosophical articles and topics are
concerned with two questions: Under what conditions is it morally
permissible/right to kill/let die a disabled person and how potentially
disabled does a fetus have to be before it is permissible/right to
25. E.g., David Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability, in EXPLORING THEORIES AND
EXPANDING METHODOLOGIES, 29 (Sharon N. Barnett & Barbara M. Altman eds., 2001).
26. Society for Philosophy and Disability, Proposed Constitution for Philosophy and Disability
(2012), available at http://societyforphilosophyanddisability.org/constitution.
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prevent its being born?28
While those utilitarian philosophers challenged the moral status of
certain disabled human beings, others challenged their political status by
qualifying them as "parasites" who never "qualified for membership of the
egalitarian club." 29 These kinds of exclusionist claims, which
fundamentally deprive certain PWD from an entitlement to be socially
integrated or respected for being different from their smarter, stronger
human counterparts, were implicitly present elsewhere in moral and
political philosophy." However, they were only explicitly defended by a
handful of philosophers who conceptualized (Licia Carlson said
"exploited"'31 ) PWD as receptacles of morally relevant properties that
would nourish academic reflections on personhood and justice. In this
debate, like in others, some ethicists like James Rachels or Jeff McMahan
endorse variants of a "moral individualist" view that tend to give priority
to individual, non-relational traits in understanding someone's value,
status and entitlements.32 This view departs from those who would seek
moral guidance from social context, ideology, relations and culture.
Certain philosophers of disability, like Licia Carlson and Eva Kittay, have
also criticized these early able-bodied philosophers of disability for not
knowing their subjects well enough. I note that this criticism in part begs
the question, when it is not only empirical, but rather assumes that
ethicists are wrong to take a moral individualist stand from the get-go, as
such a stand would excuse them from knowing their PWD subjects in the
particular relational way in which Kittay and others think they must be
known. Conversely, Singer's and McMahan's dissatisfaction with Kittay's
fundamental moral intuitions also risks begging the question.33
Another important area of disability research that was developed by
non-disabled, well-meaning scholars with medical/psychological expertise
was the field of "normalization" which evolved into the theory of social
role valorization. As one of its founders wrote,
[T]he normalization principle means making available to the mentally
retarded patterns and conditions of everyday life which are as close as
possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society.
28. Susan Wendell, Towards a Feminist Theory ofDisability, 4 HYPATIA 104 (1989).
29. VINIT HAKSA, EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PERFECTIONISM 72, 74 (1979).
30. Consider Kittay's and Nussbaum's criticisms of John Rawls's Theory of Justice. EVA
KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR (1999); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2007).
31. LICIA CARLSON, THE FACES OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 194 (2009).
32. Jeff McMahan, Our Fellow Creatures 9 J. ETHICS 353 (2005).
33. LICIA CARLSON, THE FACES OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY (2009); Eva F. Kittay, The
Personal is Philosophical is Political: A Philosopher and Mother of a Cognitively Disabled Person
Sends Notes from the Battlefield, 40 METAPHILOSOPHY 606 (2009).
34. Bengt Nirje, The Normalization Principle and Its Human Management Implications, I SRV -
VRS: THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ROLE VALORIZATION JOURNAL, 19 (1994).
2017] 299
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The important contribution of this work to the social integration of
people with intellectual disabilities into society should not be minimized.
Normalization theorists are aware of stigma-they are not under the
naturalistic and generally oppressive spell that disability is only a medical
condition. They especially know how disabled people systematically have
trouble accessing enviable social positions or being integrated into society,
hence their normalizing agenda. A criticism of this approach has been that
while its authors are effectively designing a (normalizing) strategy to deal
with a prejudiced social context, they are fundamentally catering to stigma
rather than fighting it by using potentially oppressive structures and
benchmarks of "normalcy" in order to help the differently embodied35 to
access social roles and opportunities like everyone else. Mike Oliver thus
criticized normalization theory both for failing to examine structural
oppression and for being developed by able-bodied medical experts who
"best" know how to respond to PWD's problems.3 6
It is not clear that one can fairly accuse normalization theorists of
"mistak[ing] the symptom for the problem."3 1 It may be said that they are
deliberately choosing to make social progress on a different front. It is
difficult to monitor whether this choice unwittingly reasserts oppressive
benchmarks of normalcy or over-pessimistically assumes that the
stigmatizing of difference is there to stay.3 8
Three conclusions emerge from this brief survey of the frontiers of the
philosophy of disability. First, this field asserts the importance of
disability as a distinct object of philosophical investigation poised to
profoundly illuminate moral and social philosophy, instead of denoting an
anomalous instantiation of human beings, nagging philosophical
frameworks for their incapacity to fully account for them. In other words,
philosophers of disability recognize that disability is a central rather than
peripheral feature of human life.
Second, the field is nourished by its interdisciplinarity and the healthy
disagreements taking place within it. Schools within this field are
generally unified by a commitment to social integration of PWD and their
families on the grounds of fairness and epistemological privilege, as well
as by an acknowledgement of the field's activist roots. Yet, the lenses
35. Neurologically, but also physically, as the field expanded to disabilities generally, as well as
other minority groups.
36. Michael Oliver, Capitalism, Disability, and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of the
Normalization Principle, in QUARTER-CENTURY OF NORMALIZATION AND SOCIAL ROLE
VALORIZATION: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT, 168 (Robert Flynn & Raymond Lemay eds., 1999).
37. Id. at 171.
38. See e.g., Wolf Wolfensberger, Response to Professor Michael Oliver, in QUARTER-CENTURY
OF NORMALIZATION AND SOCIAL ROLE VALORIZATION: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT, 175 (Robert Flynn
& Raymond Lemay ed., 1999); see also Wolf Wolfensberger, Response to Professor Michael Oliver
IN QUARTER-CENTURY OF NORMALIZATION AND SOCIAL ROLE VALORIZATION: EVOLUTION AND
IMPACT, 175 (Robert Flynn & Raymond Lemay eds., 1999).
300 [Vol. 29:2
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through which they describe disability and the paths they take to achieve
substantive integration are very diverse, just as diverse as philosophical
methodologies and understandings of normalcy and disability. This is not
inherently problematic (disagreements within any philosophical field are
to be expected) but it brings me to my third point.
I suggest that many theoretical disagreements within disability studies
(like the few presented above) often assume too one-sided an answer to
the complex, fundamental question of whether and to what extent
"normalcy" can and ought to play a normative role in disability policy. For
instance, normalizing theory is sometimes accused of pursuing normalcy
at the cost of disregarding whether the differences of PWD ought to be
recognized. " Conversely, social modellists are sometimes accused of
"forc[ing] us to redesign the human environment, at any cost."" Such
accusations are not always fair, but when they are, they could often be
deflected if those they target would narrow down their claim in explaining
when and how normalizing strategies seem promising, and when and how
they are worrisome. This would avoid too promptly assuming that
normalizing strategies are necessarily the vehicle of an ableist ideology or
that they are the only solutions and ideals our society should strive to
realize.
I want to present one last tension in the philosophy of disability as it
will provide us with a jumping board into the next part of this article.
There is a common and imperfect distinction made between "analytic" and
"continental" philosophical outlooks. As Carlos Prado notes, the analytic-
continental divide begins with a diverging methodological focus on
analysis and on synthesis, respectively:
Analytic philosophers typically try to solve fairly delineated
philosophical problems by reducing them to their parts and to the
relations in which these parts stand. Continental philosophers
typically address large questions in a synthetic or integrative way,
and consider particular issues to be 'parts of the larger unities' and as
properly understood and dealt with only when fitted into those
unities.4 1
Most of the philosophers I have listed above work within the analytic
tradition: Silvers, Kittay, Nussbaum, and Wasserman. I can also add Adam
Cureton, Leslie Francis, Henry Richardson, and Lawrence Becker,
amongst others, to a list of influential philosophers who have reflected on
disability in an "analytic" mode of thought. In fact, they are specifically
39. Oliver, supra note 36, at 163.
40. Christopher Boorse, Disability and Medical Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY 55 (Christopher Ralston & Justin Ho eds., 2010).
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working within the confines of liberal philosophy and often tinker with, or
answer to, John Rawls's influential theory of justice42 and its difficulty to
accommodate people with severe disabilities, especially intellectual ones.
Some of their theories explain why PWD can actually be fitted in a
Rawlsian theory of justice while others suggest that alternative principles
of justice should supplement or replace Rawlsian ones.
Many philosophers of disability, such as David Mitchell, Magrit
Shildirck, and Shelley Tremain instead draw their inspiration from
continental philosophers, such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and
Judith Butler. Those authors and their followers invite us to think about
abnormality and disability within broader social, political, cultural or
ideological contexts, within which subjects of power are constituted and
regulated, rather than as discrete phenomena abstracted from such
contexts. As previously mentioned, such views have been criticized for
being difficult to operationalize. Lawyers and policy-makers are also more
likely to be familiar with liberal theory as those theoretical elements find
their way in the normative language they routinely use. Indeed, when
disability studies finds its way into law journals, it is often through a
discussion of themes drawn from egalitarianism (and its discontents) and
through the introduction of the social model (paradoxically outdated in
some disciplines and novel in others) to legal audiences. The first
(egalitarian) lesson is generally articulated around the distinction between
substantive and formal equality or the dilemma between special and equal
treatment, 43 while the second examines how built environments or
contingent structures, physical or institutional (from classrooms to
guardianship regimes), determine how goods are distributed and socially
valued roles are attained.
These two lessons are doubtlessly important and, like the three powerful
notions I will present in the following section, they can help lawyers and
policymakers to challenge the sometimes ableist and mostly liberal
assumptions underlying their normative universe. However, legal scholars
reflecting on disability, justice, law and power from within a liberal
paradigm would also greatly benefit from integrating the insights drawn
from "continental" scholarship. More specifically, I suggest that liberal
legal and political scholarship should attempt to integrate the following
notions to their critical toolkit:
(i) Foucault's figure of the "monster" (defined below),
(ii) normalization (understood as a mode of regulation and discipline, as
explained below, rather than as a means of social integration, as within
42. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971, 1999).
43. See Martha Minow's influential version of this dilemma. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE, INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1991).
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social role valorization theory), and
(iii) the Derridean principle of "limitless welcome."
While those "continental" notions are common in certain bodies of
literature within disability studies, they are often eclipsed from
conferences or edited collections written within a liberal and/or analytic
paradigm (and vice-versa)' in a way that prompted me to examine
whether these scholarships are necessarily unable to converse and whether
the aforementioned three notions are necessarily incompatible with a
liberal framework. I acknowledge that these Foucauldian and Derridean
notions cannot be operationalized within our legal system like other
familiar concepts used in emancipatory struggles (such as "rights");
however, they may still inform the critical and ethical dispositions that
legal actors should endorse towards disability.
I suggest that the three aforementioned themes have familial
resemblance to ideas and doctrines found within liberal scholarship. I rely
principally on the work of Anita Silvers as a specific example of a
contemporary liberal disability scholar and on the work of Margrit
Shildrick as a specific example of a contemporary post-structuralist
disability scholar. Shildrick's recent monograph, Dangerous Discourses of
Disability, Subjectivity, and Sexuality, has compellingly merged some
continental modes of thought that were not obviously compatible (namely,
her marriage of Foucault and Derrida) and developed a farsighted and
empowering theory of disability. Legal scholars working within the
analytical liberal tradition would benefit from her invigorating take on
these post-structuralist concepts. The good intentions usually motivating
scholars, judges and policy-makers dealing with disability rights often
suffer from a lack of awareness of their own prejudices. The three
concepts I examine serve to bring ideology and culture under theoretical
scrutiny, something that the methodology of analytic philosophy, as well
as mainstream liberal theory and legal practice, all have considerable
difficulty doing, since they proceed from within political and legal
discourses without paying the same degree of attention to how structures
of power have predetermined the parameters of these discourses. In spite
of the theoretical gulf between post-structuralist and liberal modes of
thought, the concepts I introduce from both traditions reflect surprisingly
similar intuitions with regard to the legal treatment of PWD.
44. Compare, e.g., FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY (Shelley Tremain ed.,
2005) with DISABILITY AND DISADVANTAGE (Adam Cureton and Kimberley Brownlee eds., 2009).
Like any generalization, it is easy to find counter-examples, but just as easy to point out how different
the outlooks of (neo)Rawlsians and (neo)Foucauldians or of liberals and post-structuralists will be
even though they may examine a same phenomenon (e.g. the nature and use of equality rights, of a
"disabled identity", or of the notion of "impairments" within discussions of law and justice).
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A Note on Terminology
The title of this article ("Welcoming Monsters") has a few meanings.
First, the socially engineered figure of "disabled person" can be related to
Foucault's figure of the "monster" to which one may apply the Derridean
principle of limitless welcome. Second, monsters/Others are themselves
"welcoming", in the sense that social integration should not be seen as a
one-way street (with the dominant group assimilating the outsider), as
briefly discussed in section I.b, on normalization, below.
Thirdly, I am addressing an audience of jurists familiar with the political
liberal agenda and suggesting that they should welcome scholars like
Foucault, Derrida, Shildrick and others, who are "monstrous" in the sense
that they remain at the periphery of mainstream legal scholarship. This
also explains why this article makes use of a dichotomy between
"liberals", on the one side, and "Foucault & Derrida", on the other.
However, I am aware of the risk of caricaturing both sides of such a
dichotomy. This risk is increased if I place Foucault and Derrida together
under a shared label (e.g."post-structuralist"). Let me borrow general
definitions of structuralism and post-structuralism from Simon Blackburn
to situate the reader:
The common feature of structuralist positions is the belief that
phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their
interrelations. These relations constitute a structure, and behind local
variations in the surface phenomena there are constant laws of
abstract structure.4 5
Foucault rejected structuralism as he conceived it to imply that
"structures provide the conditions of their own existence". By contrast,
"Foucault is at pains to insist that 'conditions of possibility' are never
guaranteed; rather ancient and chance play a decisive role."4 6 This takes
him closer to a post-structuralist orientation. As Blackburn explains, the
latter generally agrees with the structuralist view that "words mean what
they do through their relations with each other rather than through their
relationship to an extra-linguistic reality", but
[P]oststructuralism adds an interest in their origins in relationships of
power, or in the unconscious . . . it does not share the structuralist
view that the unconscious, or the forms of society, will themselves
obey structural laws, waiting to be discovered. Rather, it echoes
Nietzsche's hostility to the reduction of human phenomena to lawlike
45 . SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3d ed., 2016)
("structuralism" and "postructuralism").
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generalizations, associating such views with the philosophical
underpinnings of determinist systems such as Marxism, and instead
celebrating the formless, or the subjective and spontaneous.4 7
Although Foucault resisted both the structuralist and the postructuralist
labels, he endorsed the label of "nominalist."48 Shelley Tremain, using
nominalism within the context of disability studies, defines it as:
[T]he view that there are no phenomena or states of affairs whose
identities are independent of the concepts we use to understand them
and the language with which we represent them.4 9
However, just like it would be dangerous to make generalizations about
a variety of very diverse post-structuralist thinkers, it would be daunting to
use the term "nominalist" to qualify the position that I use to criticize
liberalism since it has a long philosophical history."o
Given these terminological difficulties, I ask for patience on the reader's
part when I use contested labels like "liberalism" and "post-structuralism."
For the purpose of this article, by "liberal legal scholarship", I refer to an
umbrella of commitments to advancing individual equality and freedom
through legal means. By a "post-structuralist" critique of the limits of
liberalism, I only mean to refer to the specific authors and the specific
ideas presented in the article, especially the three notions presented in the
next section. I also chose the term "post-structuralist" to encapsulate the
critical apparatus I present below because I largely follow Shildrick's
reading of Derrida and Foucault and Shildrick qualifies herself of "post-
structuralist/post-modernist" and takes this to mean that she is "committed
to contesting the taken-for-granted grounds and structures of western
humanism,"51 a view that both Foucault and Derrida would subscribe to.
II. THREE THEMES FROM POST-STRUCTURALIST REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY
A. Foucault's Notion of "Monstrous"52
Michel Foucault used the notion of the "monstrous" to denote an
47. BLACKBURN, supra note 45 ("structuralism" and "postructuralism").
48. Barry Allen, Foucault's Nominalism, in FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY
99 (Shelley Tremain ed., 2005).
49. Shelley Tremain, On the Government of Disability 27:4 SOCIAL THEORY & PRAC. 617
(2001).
50. IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 82-4 (1999).
51. Margrit Shildrick's biographical profile (Department of Thematic Studies; Gender Studies;
Linkoping university), available at https://www.tema.liu.se/tema-g/medarbetare-och-
kontakt/shildrick-margrit.
52. The first and eleventh paragraphs of this section are partially reproduced from my essay,
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obstacle to the law. A "monster" is a being to which legal norms cannot
apply; it escapes the reach of legal authority and grasp of political power.
A King, standing above the law, is an example of a "legal monster."53
This Foucauldian terminology has therefore little to do with the concept
of "monstrous" associated with "abnormal bodies" in popular culture. The
latter connects monstrosity with a failure to live up to some human
standard (whether moral, psychological or physical), with little-to-no
attention to the incidental consequence that these shortcomings prevent
some individuals from being routinely disciplined or regulated (a
Foucauldian may say) or from being effective social participants (a
Rawlsian may say). Foucault explains this concept in his lectures at the
Collkge de France, in 1974-5, published under the title "The Abnormals":
The monster ... contradicts the law. He is the breach/offence
[infraction] . .. And yet, while being an offence, he does not trigger a
legal response ... The monster does not call for a response from the
law itself, even if he violates the law by existing. The response will
be [non-legal]: violence, a desire to suppress pure and simple, or else
medical care, or pity.54
This understanding of the "monster" as an entity transgressing or
defying the parameters of the legal order is the most contemporarily
relevant one. However, it bears noting that Foucault's analysis of
'monstrosity" within different historical periods include other
understandings of the notion closer to the popular notion of "monster" qua
hybrid or qua violation of some natural order. From the Middle Ages to
the 18th century, the "monster" was essentially a kind a hybrid. It was
therefore not only "deformed, disabled, defective", but a transgression of
nature. It was a mixture of realms (human and animals), of individuals
(siamese twins), of sexes (hermaphrodites), of life and death ("the fetus
born with a morphology that means it will not be able to live but that
nonetheless survives for some minutes or days"), and of forms ("the
person who has neither arms nor legs, like a snake")."
However, Foucault emphasizes the passage from an understanding of
monstrosity as a violation of nature to a transgression of law. In the 17th
and 18th century, if not before, monstrosity only existed "when the
confusion comes up against, overturns, or disturbs civil, canon, or
religious law":
Monstrosity . . . is the kind of natural irregularity that calls law into
53. MICHEL FOUCAULT, LES ANORMAUX, COURS AU COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1974-1975, 87-8
(1999) [author's translation].
54. Id.
55. Id. at 58. For this translation and the following ones, I use: MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL,
LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1974-1975, 63 (Graham Burchell transl., 2003).
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question and disables it. Law must either question its own
foundations, or its practice, or fall silent, or abdicate, or appeal to
another reference system, or again invent a casuistry. Essentially, the
monster is the casuistry that is necessarily introduced into law by the
confusion of nature.56
Not all disabled persons are therefore monsters in this legally
transgressive sense: "[t]he disabled person may not conform to nature, but
the law in some way provides for him." 7 Only morphologies that prevent
laws to regulate and discipline individuals are monstrous in that sense.
Foucault considers, for instance, certain cases of hermaphrodites who
can be seen both to constitute transgression to the natural order and to defy
laws regulating sexual behaviours on the basis of a defined gender.
Foucault explains how the law brutally eliminated such monsters ("[they]
were executed, burnt at the stake and their ashes thrown to the winds") by
normalizing them when possible. For instance, hermaphrodites, as it were,
could cast a human cloak upon their monstrosity, by abiding by the norms
applying to their dominant gender, under pain of being tried and
condemned to death for infringing norms regulating sexual behaviours.
Foucault also notes that one hermaphrodite case simply led to an order
(again, under pain of death) not to live with anyone of either sex. 8
These different dramatic scenarios are unfortunately familiar to
disability activists and scholars who might well note that the state
nowadays often has three main ways of responding to people with
disabilities: (1) radically excluding them (from certain social
opportunities, benefits or protections), (2) assimilating them (through
forms of integration and accommodation that help disabled people to cast
a cloak of normalcy upon their insufficiently acknowledged differences)
or (3) creating a parallel special legal regime that does not threaten
dominant social norms. Requesting the hermaphrodite to refrain from sex
should echo the contentious policies framing the sexuality of people with
disabilities, including intellectual disabilities. The reader is invited to
consult Andrew Sharpe's Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of the
Law for an extension of this Foucauldian frame of analysis to
contemporary cases of "monsters."59
A fascinating English case cited by various bioethicists and
philosophers - including scholars inspired by Michel Foucault such as
Margrit Shildrick and Andrew Sharpe is that of conjoined twins, Jodie and
Mary: Re A (conjoined twins) 6 in which British Courts decided that it was
56. Id. at 63-4.
57. Id.
58. FOUCAULT, supra note 53, at 62-3.
59. ANDREW SHARPE, FOUCAULT'S MONSTERS AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE LAW (2010).
60. Re A (conjoined twins), 2 WLR 480 (2001).
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permissible to save one of the conjoined twins at the cost of the weaker
twin's life. Shildrick notes that courts failed to even consider the
possibility that the twins, Jodie and Mary, were a single being, "Jodie-
Mary". A reading of the trial judge's and appellate judges' opinions reveal
that, in spite of their different legal views on how it was possible to justify
the dying of one twin in order to prolong the surviving twin's life, judges
assumed that they were dealing with two distinct persons. A multi-headed
entity does not exist as a legal subject, only individuals "can be
interpellated by the law", Shildrick writes.6' This case illustrates how
certain forms of differently embodied subjectivity are precluded to exist
from a legal point of view and will only be legally managed once
normalized in one way or another.
Legal scholars and political theorists could use the notion of the
monstrous by paying attention to situations where people are excluded
from political or legal subjecthood because they lack the capacities or
needs that legal procedures, institutions or rules ordinarily utilize to
achieve their goals.
For instance, alleged victims of crimes who have mental disabilities
have long been prevented from acting as witnesses in diverse jurisdictions,
because they do not have the cognitive capacity to explain the theoretical
notions of "promise", "truth" and "wrongness" or the composite idea of
"promising to tell the truth", or "it is wrong to lie". However, courts have
recently considered that their capacity to tell the truth could well be
unrelated to the sophisticated cognitive capacities required to explain the
notion of "truth" or "wrongness" (something even professional
philosophers find arduous).62
Similarly, the social contract theories of John RawlS 63 and David
Gauthier,' for instance, have excluded people with severe disabilities
because they are deemed unable to cooperate socially to a sufficient
extent. If individuals do not possess (enough of) the needs, capacities and
propensities for social participation on which modern theories of justice
from Thomas Hobbes'6 1 to John Rawls' capitalize, they cannot be part of
the social contract. This is because their differences prevent them from
being cooperative in, accountable to, or participants of, society, conceived
61. MARGRIT SHILDRICK, DANGEROUS DISCOURSES OF DISABILITY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND
SEXUALITY 118 (2012).
62. R v D.A.I., SCC 5 (2012); see also Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, D.A.I.: More Than an
Empty Gesture: Enabling Women with Mental Disabilities to Testify on a Promise to Tell the Truth, 25
CAN. J. OF WOMEN & L. 31 (2013) and Jonas-S6bastien Beaudry, The Intellectually Disabled Witness
and the Requirement to Promise to Tell the Truth, DALHOUSIE LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming Summer
2017).
63. RAWLS, supra note 42.
64. DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1987).
65. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
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as a joint venture. They are therefore cast as "monsters" in a Foucauldian
sense. It is not that they should be castigated for not being "capable
enough", but rather that there is no room for them in this theory. Their
very existence may, in fact, point to an empirical and theoretical lacuna in
contractualist theories of justice. Incorporating various PWD as subjects of
justice within such theories may stretch the theory beyond recognition
insofar as it would challenge some of its basic assumptions. Some liberal
thinkers have amended66 or partly abandoned these theories for making
use of an incomplete picture of human beings. For instance, Martha
Nussbaum has suggested to complement contractual thought with
capability theory, and Eva Kittay has suggested to complement it with
considerations drawn from care ethics.67
Not all instances of the monstrous may sway legal scholars or political
theorists to alter their views. For instance, many may readily agree to
criticize legal treatments of mentally disabled witnesses and social
contract theory, while nonetheless having reservations with regard to
conceptualizing conjoined twins as a single being. This is probably
because the two former examples suggest the kind of piecemeal criticisms
lawyers are comfortable with. Recognizing the status of Jodie-Mary as a
metaphysically single being goes further than tinkering with our legal
notions to be more responsive to the well-being of Jodie-Mary. It would
serve to destabilize liberal assumptions about individual subjectivity.
Since the twins share parts of a same body, but not a same brain, thinking
of them as a single being would challenge the mainstream assumption that
psychological capacities are the hallmark of personhood. (The situation
would be different if Jodie and Mary shared thoughts or portions of their
psychological agency).
However, even only focusing on variations in mental capacities
amounting to "monstrosity" in the Foucauldian sense could serve to
improve the well-being of outliers within a liberal framework. People with
intellectual impairments can be excluded from the moral, political and
legal community when it is understood as a community of autonomous
agents. The theoretical construction of "monsters" can be said to occur
when scholarship and legal frameworks (1) define moral and legal
personhood in terms of psychological states, may they amount to making
this subject a "respondent," 68 a "project pursuer," 69 a "subject-of-a-life" 70
66. E.g. Henry Richardson, Rawlsian Social Contract Theory and the Severely Disabled 10 J.
ETHICS 419 (2006); Cynthia Stark, Respecting Human Dignity: Contract Versus Capabilities, in
COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 111 (Eva Feder Kittay and Licia
Carlson eds., 2010); Sophia I. Wong, Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities,
Capabilities, in COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 127 (Eva Feder
Kittay and Licia Carlson eds., 2010).
67. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2007); EVA KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOUR (1998).
68. CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: VOLUME 1 97 (1985).
69. LOREN LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY, ch. 2 (1990).
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or a "moral agent" and (2) define what counts as threats to this personhood
(e.g., poor "psychological connectedness" 7 - allowing potentially
attainable future goods to matter to someone - vanishing7 2 or limited73
agency, or multiple-personality disorders). I consider such examples
below.
Critical attention to the construction of otherness has long been present
in one form or another in mainstream legal and political thought, in a way
that exemplifies that scholars defending and specifying the values of
liberalism are already making use of the ideas contained within the
Foucauldian notion of the monstrous. However, when liberals (be they
anti-discrimination theorists or human rights activists) promote concrete
institutional changes, they generally pay insufficient attention to the
ideology that previously hid them from view as possible alternatives.
Instead, they may rely on empirical findings to justify assimilation - for
instance, demonstrating that mentally disabled people are cognitively able
to tell the truth and therefore are able fulfill the truth-finding aim of
criminal trials. This integrationist outlook has two negative consequences.
First, scholars and practitioners aiming to promote equality may take
longer to detect the exclusion of problems that were carefully hidden or
naturalized by legal frameworks. Second, their modes of detection or
correction paradigmatically take the problematic form of normalization, as
we will see in the next section. Attention to the Foucauldian notion of the
"monstrous" is likely to lead to more imaginative integrative legal reforms
by triggering a scrutiny of legal frameworks or procedures that are
assumed not to be applicable to some disabled people. It would also
enable us to detect "forceful rejection in the face of radical
transgressivity" 74 that may otherwise go unnoticed. As Foucault stresses
in the quote opening this section, the monster may well be hors-la-loi
(outlaw), but that does not mean that it will enjoy a desirable fate. Not
being a legal subject may result in forceful suppression translating,
socially, into marginalization and, legally, into a suspension of rights, as in
the example of people who are not mentally competent to undergo a
criminal trial.75 Finally, Foucauldian attention to the over-reliance by legal
actors (legislators, policy-makers, judges) on psychiatric or medical
evidence may also enable legal scholars to criticize the suspension of
70. TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, (2004).
71. JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING (2003).
72. Bruce Jennings, Agency and Moral Relationship in Dementia, 40 METAPHILOSOPFHY 425
(2009).
73. Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, Thinking About the Good: Reconfiguring Liberal
Metaphysics (or Not) for People with Cognitive Disabilities, 40 METAPHILOSOPHY 475 (2009).
74. SHILDRICK, supra note 61, at 111.
75. For instance, in Starson v Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, the appellant's choice not to be medicated
and thus normalized led to his longer incarceration and treatment qua monster.
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rights, privileges and benefits of individuals with disabilities or illnesses. 6
Paying attention to the theoretical figure of the "monster" orients us
toward focusing on various ideological motivations for excluding
"abnormal" beings and enables critical thinkers to reveal hidden legalistic
modes of exclusion. Detecting the monstrous, however, requires an active
effort and learned attunement, since we naturally conceal the processes of
creating monsters to enhance our sense of control over society and over
ourselves. The monstrous is a peripheral legal notion, in the sense that it
challenges the limits of the law. Excluding tactics to deal with the
monstrous, Shildrick suggests, are akin to coping mechanisms that
alleviate anxiety: the anxiety caused by the monster's challenge to the
boundaries of our bodies, and of our legal order and subjecthood.n
Constructing the monstrous is also an insidious form of power: legal
actors unwittingly exercise this power by applying rules while leaving
their oppressive underlying foundations intact and their legitimacy
unquestioned.7 8
Alternatively, the concept of "monster" could be reappropriated as an
empowering strategy not so much to denounce the exercise of power that
constituted outsiders as to vindicate "monstrous" embodiments as
legitimate, indeed, desirable, ways of being in, and relating with, the
world. In other words, new "monsters" would be detected in order to
subvert traditional conceptions of the subject excluding PWD. A
Foucauldian would note that this would still be a form of normalization,
albeit a more demanding one testing the limits of social structures'
elasticity and ability to accommodate otherness. However, even admitting
that some form of normalization within social structures is inevitable (for
everyone, disabled or not), liberals concerned with the well-being of PWD
would already see some progress if social structures would mould PWD
less violently than they otherwise could. This alternative strategy is
illustrated through an openness to new forms of community living,
education, political participation or artistic expression unencumbered with
expectations of normalcy. Catherine Frazee expresses it elegantly when
she responds to Shildrick's discussion of the monstrous:
We are, we now assert, integral beings, authentic, viable, and worthy
of life. In a process of reinventing and self definition, we assert our
beauty and our strength and our particularity as part of the
asymmetrical, dissident, chaotic, interdependent, lumpy, leaky, and
dappled natural world. No longer the monstrous object contained
within the circus tent or the death camp, disabled people now step
76. See, e.g., Judith Mosoff, Motherhood, Madness, and Law, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 107 1995.
77. SHILDRICK, supra note 61 at 84, 112.
78. Steven Lukes similarly argues for the importance of detecting hidden conflicts of interests in
STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
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centre stage into a subject position as artists, creators, and agents of
culture.7 9
Unfortunately, this subversive exercise of power resisting
assimilationist norms and demanding radical reconfigurations of the social
order in order to make it responsive to a multiplicity of human needs and
capacities will be met by "the force of normalization", to which we now
turn. Such a force, Shildrick explains,
should never be underestimated, and I do not want to suggest that
successful resistance to the standards of sameness and difference is
assured. The norms of modernity are deeply entrenched. The
persecution of those who are classed as monstrous may operate
within historically changing parameters, but it is as persistent as it is
intolerable."o
B. Normalization
So far, we have seen that monsters threaten the legal order and our self-
understanding. They defy the state's modalities of power and parameters
of legal subjecthood. Ways to deal with them, Foucault explains, are
necessarily extra-legal.
The claim that monsters are exclusively dealt with extra-legally may
seem counter-intuitive: are the violent modes of repression or elimination
of monsters (such as the historical treatment of hermaphrodites, mentioned
above) not justified through legal means? Are people with the most
"abnormal" morphologies not still subjected to the law? Henry-Jacques
Sticker, in his History ofDisability, notes that PWD are not the monsters
medievally imagined to live "in a geographical unknown" and confirm our
own normality by helping us to imagine and answer the anguishing
question: "how would we be if we were not the way we are?" Disabled
people are, on the contrary, living in households and villages; they are
"immanent in our society and not on its borders" and make us more fearful
"because they are already there."8 1
The claim that monsters can only be dealt with in extra-legal ways only
means that monsters, by definition, evade the legal realm. Their
elimination or integration through legal means are not so much legal
treatments of those individuals qua monsters as they are means or
abstracting their monstrosity away. Disabled people can indeed be
79. Catherine Frazee, Commentary. Portrait of the Activist as a Young Monster, in YORK
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, MONOGRAPH 1: VULNERABILITY 14 (2004), available at
http://yihr.info.yorku.ca/files/2014/11/Monograph-I -Vulnerability.pdf.
80. Margrit Shildrick, Why Monsters Matter: Ethics, Anxiety and Difference, in YORK INSTITUTE
FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, MONOGRAPH 1: VULNERABILITY 9 (2004), available at
http://yihr.info.yorku.ca/files/2014/11/Monograph- I-Vulnerability.pdf.
81. HENRY-JACQUES STICKER, HISTORY OF DISABILITY 69-70 (2000).
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"normalized," i.e. made "normal", same, "one of us". Their monstrosity
thus becomes an accidental rather than essential feature of their being.
Insofar as they can be normalized, they are no longer "monsters" since
legal norms can apply to them, at least partially. This normalized portion
of themselves is entitled to legal personhood, though their legal
prerogatives and rights may only be partial. The capacities that they can
exercise like normal people are those they can exercise qua legal subjects.
Other aspects of their identity are whittled away. As Seyla Benhabib puts
it, "the other, as different from the self, disappears. . . [Differences]
become irrelevant." 82
Shildrick makes use of both Foucault's and Sticker's writings to explain
how normalization occurs through legal ordering, including through
disability rights discourses:
[L]egislation in support of people with disabilities has taken as its
baseline some notion of justice, understood either as the formal
equality of opportunity, or as a distributive model which compensates
those unable - by reason of their impairment - to take advantage of
the available options.83
Shildrick's reflections on normalization should be of particular interest
to liberals who will recognize in the previous quote the familiar way in
which rights and compensatory measures are the main kinds of benefits
bestowed upon PWD. The problem with normalization, as stated above, is
that it erases the differences of disabled people8 and this prevents social
engineers from imagining a legal order that would more meaningfully
integrate differently embodied ways of being. These issues are hardly new
to liberals, who have long problematized the lures of formal legal equality.
For instance, legal scholar Martha Minnow has problematized rigid legal
categorizations of differences. While law- and policy-makers highlight
differences in order to deal with them fairly, they may also incidentally
exacerbate these differences and reassert the validity of the "normal"
benchmarks by contrast to which differences are created. Minnow calls
this the "dilemma of difference."" Differences can be either erased
through equalizing frameworks or highlighted through compensatory ones.
The danger is to make differences intrinsic, abnormal or natural features of
individuals rather than to capture how they are (at least partly) a social
construction. It transforms certain disabling differences into the
individual's own problem and it casts different individuals as burdensome
82. Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER IN
LATE-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 89 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1986).
83. SHILDRICKsupra note 61, at 114.
84. Id.,at 113.
85. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
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members of society, requiring special, costly treatments, or as being
necessarily worse off for not being "normal."8 6 The notion of equality has
been vastly theorized within analytical moral and political literatures and
criticized for suffering from a vagueness or a mistaken focus that may
prevent it from accomplishing the valuable agenda that liberals are
expecting from it. 87
Post-structuralist reflections on normalization helpfully complement this
body of literature by more closely examining underlying structures of
power and the potentially ableist vectors they further. These underlying
structures are said to utilize political and legal notions, like equality or
rights, just like they would any other social tools, in order to persist.
Liberals generally assume that political ideals and legal tools (such as
equality and rights) sometimes fail because, innocuously enough, they are
too vague and policy-makers have not properly specified the values they
convey (axiological mistakes) or have failed to find the proper way to
materialize them (empirical mistakes). By contrast, critical analyses of
power present these mistakes as strategic devices to control the boundaries
of the social and legal order, as well as the identity of the legal subject.
Analytical moral and political theorists have more difficulty articulating
such suspicions, due to their methodological and conceptual foci.
Judges suffer from a similar lack of critical sense when arguments put
before them evoke ideological harm. For instance, non-individuated,
systemic and/or future harm is often either discounted or made secondary
to individual, immediate harm. This may draw no major concern when the
ideological harm is itself an expression of social prejudice. For instance,
Canadian courts rejected the anti-same-sex marriage argument that it
would damage the heteronormative institution of marriage. This sort of
argument was a dead letter, as the liberal legal idiom prioritizes individual
rights to equality and liberty over the social imposition of controversial
values within a community.
In other cases, however, the ideological harm would affect marginalized
or oppressed populations. For instance, Canadian courts rejected the
argument according to which legalizing physician-assisted suicide would
provide an ableist ideology with one more tool to marginalize or oppress
PWD. Numerous members of disability communities expressed the
concern that the medical profession, legal actors and the population more
generally, tend to underestimate the quality of life of PWD. For instance,
86. Anita Silvers, No Talent? Beyond the Worst Offi A Diverse Theory ofJustice for Disability,
in DISABILITY AND DISADVANTAGE (Adam Cureton and Kimberley Brownlee ed., 2009).
87. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point ofEquality? 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); Amartya Sen,
Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (Stephen
Darwall ed., 1995).
88. See, e.g., Halpern v. Canada 95 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (2002); Hendricks v. Quebec R.J.Q. 2506
(2002); Barbeau v. British Columbia BCCA 251 (2003).
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PWD have often reported that medical professionals underestimate the
value of their life, provide them with poorer care, more casually dismiss
their needs, or attempt riskier treatment to deal with their health issues.
Other representatives of disability communities worry that opening suicide
as a socially acceptable option may feed heroic narratives according to
which disabled people should sacrifice themselves for the greater good."
Whether or not this kind of harm should justify the legal prohibition of
assisted suicide is a different, controversial question. Many disabled
people and philosophers of health and disability think that it does not. Dan
Brock and Anita Silvers, for instance, both think that physician-assisted
suicide can be legalized while the disability community and policy-makers
continues to fight against ableism on distinct or related fronts.90 However,
scholars like Silvers are at least aware of the harm that others are worried
about. What is striking in the recent case law that legalized assisted-dying
in Canada is how, from the trial level to the Supreme Court, ableist
ideological harm received no more than a polite, normatively ineffective,
nod-an acknowledgement of existence.91
To summarize, an attention to normalizing processes - that is, to the
fact that some kinds of harm, needs and capacities are dismissed out of
hand because they are assumed to be irrelevant to the protection and equal
treatment of "normal" legal subjects - would enable liberals to closely
scrutinize these otherwise unreflectively endorsed processes and
assumptions.
Scholars working within critical legal studies are already suspicious of
apparently neutral language, as well as of legal objects presented as
"natural" rather than socially and legally constructed. The same kind of
academic gap between intellectual and methodological postures between
post-structuralist and liberal scholarships I am gesturing at in this article
also occurs within law schools between factions of "traditional" legal
scholarship and "Crits." 92 Fortunately, it can also be said that newer
generations of law students are trained to be sensitive to ideological
vectors, political power, systemic prejudices, and other policy-related
matters that were previously considered as falling outside of the study of
law proper. While there are still institutional bastions of critical thinking
89. See, for example, Catherine Frazee's amicus curiae brief in Carter v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2015] 1 SCR 331 (on file with author) and factums on appeal by interveners opposing the
legalization of medical aid in dying in Lee Carter, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al.
(Supreme Court of Canada, docket 35591). See also Carol J. Gill, No, We Don't Think Our Doctors
Are Out to Get Us: Responding to the Straw Man Distortions of Disability Rights Arguments Against
Assisted Suicide, 3 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 31 (2010).
90. Dan W. Brock, A Critique of Three Objections to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 109 ETHICS 519
(1999); Anita Silvers, Protecting the Innocents-People with Disabilities and Physician-Assisted Dying
166 WESTERN J. OF MEDICINE 407 (1997).
91. Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 886 at para.194 and 811-815; Carter v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 SCR 331.
92. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Studies, 10 LEG. STUD. F. 335, 338 (1986).
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and analytic thinking (contrast the law faculties of Birkbeck and Oxford,
in England, and the philosophy departments of the New School and NYU,
in the United States), legal scholars, practitioners and students are
increasingly exposed to critical theory, or at least endorse, even while
maintaining a traditional liberal language, its anti-naturalizing stance. This
is partly due to the increased visibility of feminist and social justice
scholarship whose work on equality enables legal practitioners to better
respond to oppression.
Judges and policymakers can of course legitimately refuse hypotheses
concerning structures of power and ideology on the ground that they are
not sufficiently rigorously argued. It is the task of legal scholars,
practitioners and empirical researchers from various disciplines, to provide
such an argument by examining the fine grain, history and concrete impact
of exclusionary legal structures. Arguments concerned with the harms
caused by an ableist ideology may be rejected on the ground that they are
insufficiently supported, but not out of hand on the basis of qualitative
inadmissibility. Such an outright rejection should itself be scrutinized as a
potential expression of an ableist ideology. We learn from Foucault that
subjects exercising power may otherwise be well-meaning legal actors and
meticulous theorists. 93 Legal actors, like all other subjects, "do not
consciously exercise power; they are merely power's passive objects." 94
A focus on normalizing processes may also enrich the influential "social
model" of disability, which is probably the key lesson that disability
studies have succeeded to teach to legal actors. 9 The medical model of
disability postulates that disability is an individual, physiological issue, to
be defined and dealt with by the medical profession. It roughly views
disability as a long-term disease affecting one's functions. The social
model of disability, by contrast, situates disability outside of individual
bodies and postulates that it is a social phenomenon. People, its motto
goes, are disabled by society (i.e. social exclusionary structures) rather
than their bodies. 96
93. It may seem surprising that philosophers themselves would become peons of ideological
structures. However, like judges whose role is to apply the law rather than question its underlying
structures, philosophers may focus their effort on the specific task of analyzing a concept in
abstraction of its historical use by various social actors. On ableist prejudices found in philosophical
literature, see LICIA CARLSON, FACES OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY (2009).
94. Kevin Jon Heller, Power, Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault, 25 SUBSTANCE 78
(1996).
95. Consider, for example, Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education,[1997] 1 S.C.R. 241
(S.C.C.) and Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.). See also
Ravi Malhotra, Has the Charter Made a Difference for People with Disabilities?: Reflections and
Strategies for the 21st Century, 58 SUPREME COURT L. REV. (2012).
96. These definitions aim at briefly defining the key ideas behind the primitive versions of these
models; they do not do justice to their numerous refined versions, nor to the medical profession which
has greatly "socialized" its understanding of disability. See Jonas-S6bastien Beaudry, Beyond (Models
of) Disability? 41 1. MED. PHILOS. 210 (2016).
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Although proponents of the social model are already aware of the
benefits and harms associated with normalization, Shildrick suggests that
both the medical and social models of disabilities limit themselves to a
value-laden discourse of rights and fail to "recognise either the
disciplinary effects, or the irreducible incompletion and instability, of [the]
discourse[s] [they produce to achieve social justice]." 97 Shildrick's
comments on disability models will particularly resonate with social
justice scholars when she mentions that both the medical and the social
models of disability make use of rights discourse in a way that fails to deal
with the limitations of such "legally situated notions of justice and
equality":
Any serious account of rights will need to acknowledge the multiple
complexities that inform the differences between positive and
negative rights and their relation to diverse forms of justice; the issue
of conflicting rights; the problem of differential access to law; and
even the question of whether rights should be preferred to alternative
values. 98
Both the medical and the social models of disabilities, putting aside
their respective merits, have flaws and limitations, one of which is their
tendency to normalize PWD. The social model tells us that disabled
people have been disabled by society: they are actually not "disabled
people" in any essential way. Rather, they are "people disabled by X". For
instance, the disabling issue of a wheelchair user would not be, say a
particular paralysis of her body, but the lack of a ramp to access a building
in a wheelchair. It is this particular infrastructure that would "disable" a
wheelchair user, not the fact that she moves in an "abnormal," but
functionally efficient, way. The social model, for better and for worse,
sometimes convey the idea that disabled people can be brought in line,
given proper adjustments. It still often uses normalcy as a benchmark to
articulate its claims, thus reinforcing disabling "normal" structures and
expectations of normalcy even as it asks for accommodations within such
structures or exceptions to such expectations.
The medical model normalizes disabled people in a different way. It
tells us that PWD have a problem that is internal to them. The problem is
not social; it is individual, medical and physiological. Instead of fixing
society, society must fix them. The premiss, however, is that PWD can or
should be "fixed" medically. Disability is analogized to a disease to be
cured. The "person with a disability" has the prospect of becoming a
"person" full stop. Even if this person does not have this prospect, the
medical model categorizes her as physiologically deficient, and more
97. SHILDRICK, supra note 61, at 114-5.
98. Id. at il4.
2017] 317
27
Beaudry: Welcoming Monsters: Disability as a Liminal Legal Concept
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
generally as worse off. By casting the disabled person as a "defective"
person or subject, even when she cannot be cured, the medical model goes
a long way in normalizing her. It places her, as it were, within a well
delineated exception to "what should be." Disability perceived as a
statistical aberration can then be cast as the unlucky misfortune of not
being "what one should be". It is assumed to be a negative state of affairs
and medical treatments normalizing individuals are seen as the proper
response. The anxiety of able-bodied people dealing with differences is
alleviated because this difference no longer threatens their identities and
the way they imagine themselves, that is, the physical, social, political,
legal and phenomenal boundaries of their selves. Disabilities are
conceptualized as non-essential features of unfortunate persons, who
would otherwise be seen as "normal people". In ethical terms, this
modelling often translates to a duty of charity toward these "unlucky
souls", fuelled by self-aggrandizing commiseration ("but for the Grace of
God, there goes I"). Disabled people have a long history of being the
recipients of charity and compassion, in addition to being monstrous. 99
It is much less costly to our social structures to conceptualize the
disabilities of PWD as non-essential features of their being. Insofar as
their otherness can be theorized away, their integration does not threaten
our social, legal and economic order to the same extent since they can be
moulded to fit the "normal" environment rather than the other way around.
By contrast, recognizing disabled people's differences would require
society to be fully receptive to their "abnormal" embodiment rather than
theorize it away. It would not redefine otherness into sameness before
facing the ethical demand PWD make on society, as they request concern,
respect, integration, love, and the myriad of moral attitudes that able-
bodied people have come to expect from fellow members of their
community. This change of perspective would furthermore challenge our
autonomy-centered legal traditions, our economic capitalist structures, our
network of private and public roles, and the morphology of what we take
to be desirable bodies (as opposed to abject or disgusting). This call to
acceptance, made in dozens of ways within the interdisciplinary field of
disability studies, would be revitalized with an awareness of the social,
psychological and economic factors standing in the way of hearing it.'"
Once heard, however, what ethical principles could sustain this awareness
of otherness? In other words, what disposition or attitude should legal
actors endorse vis-a-vis differences threatening our legal order and
mainstream conceptions of the legal subject? And can such an ethical
99. See sources cited supra notes 15 & 86.
100. For instance, Shildrick proposes a diagnosis of anxiety to explain society's discomfort with
different forms of embodiment, see supra note 61, at ch.4. I have discussed affective responses to
disability elsewhere, see supra note 52.
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outlook ever become part of out legal order? Those are the questions that
will occupy the rest of this article.
C. The Principle of "Limitless Welcome"
Confronted with structures of power that seek to expel, segregate or
normalize, one avenue open to PWD is to propose and vindicate new
social structures. This exercise may be called "resistance", to use a term
that Foucault has defined as a multiplicity of social vectors playing the
"role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations." 01
Whether "resistance" is a necessary by-product, antagonist, or component
of power, or whether "one man's resistance is just another man's
power"1 02 is a debated question in Foucauldian scholarship, since the
concept of resistance may be interpreted differently in light of Foucault's
earlier and later work.103 Kevin J. Heller explains that Foucault does not
mean to essentially distinguish power from resistance, or hegemonic
power from anti-hegemonic power. Resistance is simply another exercise
of power, that is, "the capacity to modify the actions of others."" Heller
suggests that Foucault calls this power "resistance" to stress it is exercised
by less powerful groups.
Social modellists of disability, found amongst scholars in law, sociology
and political philosophy, as well as within activist groups, can be seen as
formulating such a resistance. As Shildrick explains, "[t]o call on the law
as disabled is scarcely a challenge to the normative standards of
ablebodiedness that tacitly underlie the liberal humanist notion of a legal
subject.""os In other words, if PWD accept social structures that already
cast them as physiologically defective, this will limit the kind of social
demands they can make. They will typically be limited to medical care or
forms of compensation, rather than more substantive social integration and
architectural and institutional changes to their environment. Similarly, if
they do not challenge a theory of justice that presents them as unlucky or
worse off deserving only of compensation rather than being integrated as
talented social participants, they would only be entitled to resources
enabling them to reach the outcome, the "finish line", that able-bodied
people ordinarily achieve rather than to resources placing them on a same
starting line." This is why the social model of disability, in spite of the
101. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I, THE WILL TO KNOWLEDGE 95
(1978).
102. MARK G. E. KELLY, FOUCAULT'S THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1, THE WILL TO
KNOWLEDGE 69 (2013).
103. Brent Pickett, Foucault and the Politics ofResistance, 28 Polity 445 (Summer, 1996).
104. Heller, supra note 94, at 116.
105. SHILDRICK, Supra note 61, at 103.
106. Silvers, supra note 86. ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN AND MARY B. MAHOWALD,
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great number of criticisms that it has received (as any new paradigm
does), has often been described as empowering and freeing to many
individuals who had previously accepted that disability was a problem,
and was their problem.
The work of Anita Silvers, who thinks about disability from within the
tradition of liberal justice, can also be seen as providing the disability
community with a language of resistance.107 Only by refusing the place
that the legal order and traditional liberal theories of justice give them can
PWD constitute their own legal subjecthood rather than "unavoidably
consolidate the power of the system that constitutes and sustains such
binaries [disabled/able-bodied; dependent/independent] in the first
place."10 8
Shildrik, however, believes that "there is more at stake than the
performativity of resistance." in The disability community (broadly
understood as anyone implicated in empowering PWD) may well offer
counter-discourses to resist assimilation, but these discourses would not
exhaust the inexhaustible otherness that disability presents. Shildrick is
haunted by the "remaining undecidability that is never entirely settled or
resolved by the technologies of power that shape the notion of
disability". 10
Many disability scholars would not deny that the concept of disability
has numerous and fluid facets that cannot be reduced to a single meaning.
Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson believe it is for this reason a
paradigmatically post-modern concept. "' Shildrick turns to Jacques
Derrida, who deals more specifically with the insufficiency of law to
capture an ever-changing otherness:
For both writers [Derrida and Foucault], the law is never impartial
but always caught up with the strategies of power and a discursive
violence that seeks to grasp and domesticate the troublesome other.
Yet where Foucault sees resistance inherent within the productive
power of normativity and governmentality, for Derrida, the law must
be [. . .] rethought in relation to an impossible justice. When Derrida
speaks of justice, he refers not to the here-and-now application of law
through the agency of the police and the courts, but to that which is
always yet to come.1 12
107. Id.
108. SHILDRICK,supra note 61, at 116.
109. Id., at 113.
110. Id.
111. Tom Shakespeare The Social Model ofDisability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 266
(L. J. Davis ed., 2010); see also C. Boorse, Disability and Medical Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 55 (D.C. Ralston, J. Ho ed., 2010).
112. SHILDRICK, supra note 61, at 107.
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Shildrick favours the Derridean approach over the Foucauldian one for
maintaining the "singularity and strangeness" of the "monstrous arrivant",
the stranger who disrupts legal normativities.'"3 She endorses Derrida's
intimation of extending our hospitality to anomalous bodies who will
inevitably and always transgress the law.
The idea that we ought to be receptive to the differences of others in
order to fulfill our moral duties toward them is also present in liberal
theory making sense of civil rights struggles. Philosophers and jurists
working committed to the joint liberal ideals of liberty and equality have
long recognized that formal equality (giving the same to all, irrespective of
their individual differences) will fail to achieve the ideal of equality. In
1950, Justice Frankfurter in Dennis v. United States wrote that: "[i]t was a
wise man who said that there is no greater inequality than the equal
treatment of unequals." 1 l 4 In 1989, Justice McIntyre, on the Supreme
Court of Canada, quoted him and added that "the admittedly unattainable
ideal [of equality] should be that a law expressed to bind all should not
because of irrelevant personal differences have a more burdensome or less
beneficial impact on one than another.""'
The liberal desideratum to treat different people impartially in spite of
their differences nonetheless reasserts the terms according to which they
granted various entitlements as members of a community. By contrast, the
notion of Derridean hospitality is not characterized only by a preparedness
to receive the other as a guest in one's own "home" (i.e. one's society or
institutions) but by a disposition to endure a kind of threat to one's home
and self, and even not to be prepared for such a threat when it creeps up on
us. As Jacques de Ville explains, "[h]ospitality thus involves the subject
being both host and hostage. There is consequently no 'I', in an individual
or collective sense, having the ability or power to make room for the
other."' 16 This involves a threat on one's identity prior to this genuinely
hospitable meeting with the "disabled other."" 7 This is how Derrida
describes the destabilizing potential of the radically Other, which he calls
"absolute arrivant":
[T]he arrivant par excellence, is whatever, whoever, in arriving, does
not cross a threshold separating two identifiable places, the proper
and the foreign, . . . I am talking about the absolute arrivant, who is
not even a guest. He surprises the host ... enough to call into
question, to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate, all
the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very
113. Id. at 122.
114. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950).
115. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, I SCR 143, 165 (1989).
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border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names
and language, nations, families and genealogies. The absolute
arrivant does not yet have a name or an identity. It is not an invader
or an occupier, nor is it a colonizer, even if it can also become one.
... Nor is the arrivant a legislator or the discoverer of a promised
land. As disarmed as a newly born child, it no more commands than
is commanded . . . . It even exceeds the order of any determinable
promise.1
This hospitable outlook requires legal and political actors (and citizens
more generally) to endorse an attitude of openness toward the person
whose embodiment and relations with others and the world, challenge
both our individual identity and our shared values and public goals. This
openness includes not only a concern for this outsider but also a
disposition to be changed and challenged by her. For instance, the
different capacities of a PWD within a particular social environment
threaten the conception of a citizen as a worker able to take part of
individualized, competitive modes of production, and therefore threatens
capitalist ideology. It also emphasizes the traits of vulnerability and
dependency that ineliminably characterize human life. Yet, as Alasdair
McIntyre has noted:
[T]he history of Western moral philosophy suggests otherwise. From
Plato to Moore and since there are usually, with some rare
exceptions, only passing references to human vulnerability and
affliction and to the connections between them and our dependence
on others.11 9
Individual and collective, psychological and ideological, vectors prevent
us from being genuinely receptive to otherness, by making one's society
and self vulnerable to its threatening or anxiogenic character. Such
receptivity is not an unusual experience between family members and
friends, who often mutually influence their respective identities and
interactively construct the dynamics of their relations. The suggestion to
expand it writ large to all human beings if not all living things does seem
to raise the threat of empathetic exhaustion and it also seems to strain the
kind of moral commitments ordinary people are able or willing to
undergo. Yet, the integrationist challenge is to render such threats
manageable or acceptable rather than to dismiss the profound
epistemological and moral insights that such a receptive, open, disposition
has the potential to bring us.
There is a meaningful difference between a disposition to put one's own
118. JACQUES DERRIDA,APORIAS, 33-34 (1993).
119. ALASDAIR MACINYTRE, DEPENDENT, RATIONAL ANIMALS 1 (2001).
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identity at risk and a disposition to help "abnormal" people. There is a
meaningful difference between challenging the parameters of one's
community's mode of interactions and cooperation and a disposition to
reconsider how to best integrate PWD within one's community as it
currently exists. The less vulnerable the dominant, "welcoming," group is
willing to make itself, the more likely it is that the inclusion it finally
bestows upon the outlier expresses enduring ideological vectors under
other names. This is why social justice scholars and critical legal theorists
must continually explain why a myriad of novel efforts to reach our ideals
of equality run the risk of reproducing harmful ideological commitments
that will endure under new forms.
The task of the legal philosopher committed to the Derridean ideal of
hospitality, Jacques De Ville writes, is to "expose that which makes [legal
concepts] possible in the first place;" it is "a movement away from
essence, consistency and truth towards the (dangerous) logic of the
perhaps."2 0 Shildrick explains that such a risk is not only worth taking
because of what it will teach us about ourselves and for the sake of the
"adventure of reconfiguring disability to feel and act differently". It is also
"an ethical necessity - a responsibility to otherness - that leaves no-one
behind."l 2 ' As such, the Derridean most robust version of hospitality, the
"Law of absolute hospitality", is not a mere prescription of other-
regarding concern, but a disposition to welcome the unknown. I have
made a reference to the sort of other-regarding concern taking place within
a family above because it would be familiar to liberal scholars working
with the notions of care and empathy, but the Derridean ideal of absolute
hospitality, is distinct from a prescription of other-regarding concern that
would be directed at someone the agent already knows (and conditional
upon some form of knowledge). As Derridean interpreter Judith Still
describes it, "The door is open - even, there is no door, but rather perfect
openness. Anything, however alien, can come in an take what it likes, do
as it likes."'22
This desideratum of relatively unquestioning inclusion cannot be
formulated as radically within liberal scholarship without threatening
certain of its central tenets. More specifically, many liberal philosophers
and social justice scholars are driven by the intuition that "everyone
should be welcome" - even though their perceived obligation to answer to
the question "how is this obligation of hospitality justified by liberalism?"
mitigates the normative impact of this drive.
For instance, in their article on social contract theory, Justice through
120. DE VILLE, supra note 116, at 199.
121. SHILDRICK, supra note 61, at 177.
122. JUDITH STILL, DERRIDA AND HOSPITALITY 18 (2010).
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Trust,123 Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis deal with a major issue that
social contract theories have been confronted with: the exclusion of PWD.
Social contract theories are generally divided in two strands:
"contractarian" and "contractualist." Very roughly, contractarian theory
pictures society like a contract between self-interested participants who
are potentially capable of benefitting or threatening others. It is associated
with thinkers like David Gauthierl24 and nested in a tradition going back to
Thomas Hobbes. 125 Contractualist theory, on the other hand, pictures
society as the product of a reasonable contract-like procedure. 126 It is
associated with thinkers like John Rawls127 and Thomas Scanlonl 28 and
nested in a tradition going back to Immanuel Kant. 129 Contractarians
exclude some PWD because they are deemed unable to sufficiently benefit
the other self-interested participants to the social contract. Contractualists
exclude some disabled people because they cannot take part to contracting
procedures (which may be associated with a lack of moral power such as
moral agency, and not only a lack of capacity to act as a cooperative
contractor).
Silvers's and Francis's argument posits that society depends on trust to
flourish. They also find that this requirement is embedded in the social
contract tradition (rather than propose it as a novel interpretation): without
the possibility of building, maintaining and fostering trust, no social
cooperation would be possible. This first move is hard to contradict. Their
next move, plausible, but more controversial, is to argue that integrating
disabled people as full members of our society will foster such trust. This
second move is not only more controversial because it may be empirically
challenged, but also because it provides PWD with what seems like an
accidental or secondary moral status. While their arguments are
compelling, some may find that their effort to preserve the language of the
social contract and its requirement that people be conceptualized as active
social participant fails to challenge the traditional liberal conception of the
subject of justice. Instead, the boundaries of the social contract are
123. Anita Silvers & Leslie Francis, Justice through Trust: Disability and the "Outlier Problem"
in Social Contract Theory, 116 ETHICS 40 (2005).
124. GAUTHIER, supra note 64.
125. HOBBES, supra note 65.
126. This is not to say that contractarians are not "reasonable": of course, they "reasonably"
pursue the outcome that would maximize their self-interest. However, their prudential, self-regarding
goal differs from the contractualist focus on achieving an outcome that would respect participants qua
decision-makers. Another way to distinguish them would be to say that contractarians emphasize the
use of reason as instrumental whereas contractualists consider reasonability as a trait warranting a
particular moral response. For a detailed description of those schools, see Cressida Heyes, Identity
Politics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum20l6/entries/identity-politics/.
127. RAWLS, supra note 42.
128. THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
129. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797).
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stretched to integrate "outliers" in a way that risks normalizing them
instead of challenging the status quo.
This argument written within the liberal tradition strikes me as a good
illustration of the sort of analytical philosophy of disability that formulates
ideas close to Derridean ideals of hospitality, but yet falls short of fully
considering their emancipatory potential.
Consider, for instance, their notion of "outliers" or "out-groups," which
refers to individuals or a group of marginalized people (disabled people,
African Americans, women, etc.) who are placed by the contract model
"beyond the reach of equal justice."130 They define "outliers" elsewhere as
"kinds of people who traditionally have been ignored by both theories and
practices of justice." 131 Even though this notion overlaps with the
Foucauldian notion of the monstrous, the notion of "outlier" does not
problematize the processes that constructed the category of outlier
(although Silvers and Francis do note that dominant groups will typically
use their own traits to define the entitlements-giving features that outliers
do not possess). This could be justified by an argumentative focus on the
current state of affairs and an eye to future reconceptualization, rather than
by a critical focus on the past with an eye to historical denunciation.1 32
Yet, the former kind of focus fails to question the structure of power in
place. Note the use of the passive tense in the definition of "outliers"
above, as though PWD were haphazardly, arbitrarily ignored by "theories
and practices of justice," rather than constructed on the basis of their traits,
themselves conceptualized as deviances from a norm. This incomplete
definition of the problem may, in turn, lead to an incomplete solution. If
PWD seek integration by using the language of the law and showing that
they belong to their community as per the condition set by this language,
they will only achieve an entitlement to normalization.
Silvers and Francis come as close as liberals do to proposing bringing
the Derridean ideal of "limitless welcome" within liberal justice when they
write that "[j]ustice reigns . .. in virtue of having been shaped in response
to the need of "outliers" to achieve successful personal trust
relationships."13 3 In another article, Silvers defines outliers as "people who
depart significantly from the prevailing paradigm for philosophical
130. Silvers & Francis, supra note 123, at 42.
131. Francis & Silvers, supra note 73, at 238. See also Silvers & Francis, supra note 123, at
footnote 14: "Historically, members of groups such as racial minorities, women, and the disabled have
been 'outliers,' but in principle anyone might be exiled to the margin of society and thereby become
an 'outlier'."
132. It may also be explained by a focus on an ideal theory (social contract theory) rather than on
its use by social actors engaged in power relationships. At the risk of generalizing, this would reflect
the "analytical" tendency to take ideal theories seriously (making it worthwhile to offer a more
accurate, compelling or coherent - critics of Silvers and Francis would say revisionist - account of said
theory) whereas critical and "continental" scholars read those such theories as as discursive tools
designed and used to justify and exercise power.
133. Silvers & Francis, supra note 123, at 45.
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considerability" and she goes beyond (1) the normalizing step of showing
that disabled people meet the existing requirement for considerability or
(2) the attempts to "resist" this paradigm by suggesting a different test of
considerability. 134 Here is how she describes in greater details the
foundations of this "expansive, responsive, and receptive theory of
justice":
[W]hen moral and political theorizing embraces outliers, other areas
of philosophy are enriched, for moral and political theories not only
reflect how we do treat each other, but also guide how we ought to
value and treat each other. . . . Absent persuasive and powerful
principles of justice to bring outliers of every sort into interaction
with the rest of society, philosophers, like other citizens, are likely to
remain ignorant about and dismissive of them, an arrangement that
depletes philosophy as much as every other human practice.13
The utility of bridging the work of scholars from different philosophical
traditions become apparent when one juxtaposes Anita Silvers's train of
thoughts, above, with Margrit Shildrick's own suggestion, below:
[I]t is in the very ambiguity of the monstrous that we may begin to
discern different ways forward. The monster is a figure of fear and
fascination because it is never wholly other. For all that it remains
excessive of any category; it matters because it tells us things about
ourselves. Though it may evoke anxiety and loathing, it always
claims us, always touches us and implicates us in its own
becoming. 136
On the one hand, Shildrick's insights prompt liberals to consider
whether and how they could handle the liminality of the concept of the
"monstrous" and, mutatis mutandis, of "disability." On the other, Silvers
teaches two lessons to an adherent of the principle of "limitless welcome".
First, she gives it an important instrumental purpose. She explains that
openness to anomalous abilities will make political thinkers (and by
extension also judges, law-makers, and the general population) more
knowledgeable about the possibilities of human embodiments, and
therefore about others and ourselves. The claim that expanding our
knowledge about human embodiment, relations and vulnerability is
inherently valuable seems congenial to liberals, who are committed to
welcoming minority opinions and outlooks' 37 Her framework also holds
the promise of integrating outliers rather than maintaining them
134. Silvers, supra note 86.
135. Id. at 164.
136. SHILDRICK, supra note 61, at 9.
137. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
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permanently hors-la-loi. Like most liberals, she has faith that modernist
projects can succeed if amended and need not to be jettisoned or treated as
a space within which principles of hospitality could never be
implemented.
Second, she explicitly tells us that this disposition of hospitality or
welcome must be entrenched in specific principles of justice rather than be
left as an ideal to be, or not, endorsed by moral agents. This programmatic
incorporation of a principle of "limitless welcome" within liberal theories
of justice is embryonic, but still more promisingly specific than the
Derridean ideal. This specificity does not prevent Silvers's principle of
receptivity from responding to a wide variety of alterity. Similarly, the
instrumental dimension of her principle does not necessarily impinge upon
the non-instrumental value of being responsive to alterity. Rather, it
locates this value within a theory of justice where it serves further
instrumental ends.
However, a liberal version of the principle of "limitless welcome"
would have limitations. It is appealing to liberals precisely because it
maintains a requirement of reciprocity, which is quite central to both
schools within the social contract tradition, may it be understood in a tit-
for-tat (contractarian) manner or in a (contractualist) display of mutual
respect. However, the principle of limitless welcome is not conditional
upon reciprocity. How could one develop, from a liberal point of view,
Silvers's idea that "no one should be an outlier"? One would have
difficulty, at least, to connect it to the goal of fostering trust alone.
Certainly, picturing the political subject as potentially vulnerable and
dependent - in need of a society fostering trust - is more promising a
description than the narrow traditional understanding of legal subject as
autonomous and self-sufficient. The former conception is closer to our
experiences and it better captures some of our ethical duties toward one
another as we would ordinarily intuit them. However, what about the
stranger, the abnormal, the monster, whose presence in our community
fosters distrust or the kind of anxiety that hinders cooperation?
Additionally, is a contractualist understanding of trust all that there is to
justice? Is it worth focusing on it so much as to obscure other equally
important reasons to welcome people in our community?
Perhaps Judith Still provides us with a notion of reciprocity that would
lie between a liberal and a Derridean ethics. Still analyses different
categories of social interactions, gradually progressing from the most self-
interested kind of reciprocity ("simple commerce") to a disposition of
hospitality requiring no reciprocity whatsoever ("absolute hospitality").
On the way from "simple commerce" to "absolute hospitality", she
mentions increasingly complex or indirect forms of social exchanges - the
most indirect and diffuse category of reciprocity ("indirect social
exchange") would look very much like Silvers and Francis's model of
fostering trust to facilitate reciprocal interactions. The category of
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"invitation without reciprocity" is the one I want to draw attention to:
You are perceived as 'without' means (home, money, contacts) and I
invite you to dinner without the expectation that you will eventually
do the equivalent either for me or someone else or that I will ever be
in your situation where someone could do the same for me.1 38
She explains that even such situations could imply some kinds of
reciprocity, through an "imaginative recognition of similarity". In her
words : "I could be in your position even if it is not likely; if I ever were in
your situation then I would want to be treated thus. Hence the possibility
of common 'humanity' as similarity alongside difference."' The idea of a
shared fate - potentially extendable to animals as well - would nourish an
imaginative kind of reciprocity. One may well note that Silvers and
Francis' theory is similar: indeed, what if building trust required to foster
this kind of imaginatively shared fate? This understanding of reciprocity
would, however, constitute a Derridean (or Levinasian) reading of the
liberal ethos, placing hospitality at its heart, which may well be desirable
if Derrida is correct to claim that "hospitality . . is ethicity itself, the
whole and the principle of ethics". 140 However, taken to its ultimate
conclusion, this outlook would ask liberals to renounce to liberalism, for
hospitality would displace freedom in their pyramid of values. One avenue
of research in the field would be to explore whether and how freedom
could be interpreted in a way that requires hospitality to trump not over
freedom, but over non-hospitable understandings of freedom. In other
words, hospitality would not be seen as antithetical to freedom insofar as,
even when it seems to threaten it, it would in fact enable it. The hypothesis
to test would be that one cannot truly be free without being hospitable or
welcoming to others.
Be that as it may, just like a liberal framework would confront post-
structuralist notions with the potentially unproductive vagueness of their
open-endedness, such foundational questions would confront liberals'
normalizing and reductionist tendency to justify social integration and
exclusion on the basis of a few goods (e.g., trust, cooperation, negative
liberty) that may well be the unwitting vehicle of (individualist, capitalist,
ableist) ideologies and the result of arbitrarily narrow understandings of
subjectivity, equality and freedom.
III. EXTRA-LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The ethical obligation to challenge the frontiers of our legal order
138. STILL,supra note 122, at 17.
139. Id.
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cannot wholly be transformed into a legal duty. The concepts explored in
the previous Part of this article are, by design, placed outside of the law.
The virtue of this theoretical move is to always preserve an emancipatory
space where those mechanisms and ideals can be discussed, (re)defined,
and used as guidance to revise our current legal and political order. As
Peter Goodrich notes of Derrida:
He never got to talk about law, he never seemed to want to, he held
off. What he did do, however, was take lawyers to task, directly and
more likely indirectly, by reintroducing what law has historically
separated itself from: amity, community, femininity, felicity.' 4 '
Structuralist and post-structuralist criticisms of our legal order can
empower PWD by providing them with a narrative about the construction
of their otherness and their exile from the legal order, as well as by
enabling them to demand that their subjective experiences, needs,
capacities and ways of interacting be recognized like that of their fellow
citizens. However, they remain problematic qua legal tools. The idea of
the monstrous is a critical notion marking the limits of the law rather than
being a substantial part of the law. Similarly, the principle of "limitless
welcome" constitutes an ethical demand and it directs us to an ideal of
justice that can never be codified. It necessarily stands outside of the legal
order; the justice it aims at is ideal. It stipulates that the "monstrous
arrivant" always and necessarily transgresses the law and should defy
normalization. 142
For Derrida, the law of absolute hospitality lies outside of the legal
realm of hospitality rights just as surely as the ideal of justice lies outside
of the realm of law.1 43 However, Jacques Derrida urges that this "is not
bad news" for progressive politics. The fact that law is deconstructible and
that justice, always "outside of beyond law" is always "d-venir" (to come;
i.e. never realized) constitutes a licence for "the transformation, the
recasting or refounding of law and politics"" that social justice scholars
should welcome.
Foucault's genealogical concepts and analyses are not only extra-legal,
they may not even be able to provide us with a basis for emancipatory
politics, legal or not. While some scholars seem to at least imply that
Foucault's critical genealogy will equip individuals with a liberating
knowledge of the processes through which they have been subjugated,
others note that to impute Foucault's subjects with a capacity to freely
141. Peter Goodrich, Introduction: Un Cygne Noir, 27:2 CARDOZO L. REV. 529, 541-2 (2005).
142. SHILDRICK,supra note 61, at 122-24.
143. ANNE DUFOURMANTELLE & JACQUES DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY: ANNE DUFOURMANTELLE
INVITES JACQUES DERRIDA TO RESPOND 25-27 (Rachel Bowlby, transl., 2000).
144. Jacques Derrida, Force ofLaw: the Mystical Foundation ofAuthority 11 CARDOZo L. REV.
920, 943, 945, 969, 971 (Mary Quaintance transl., 1989-1990).
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resist power misunderstands Foucault's theory of subjectivity. This is
because of Foucault's fatalism, thus explained by Bill Hughes:
In Foucault's work, the body is a target (of power), an effect, a text
upon which to write . . . The body is constituted as passive, without
agency, the plaything of discourse and text, and a surface ripe for
inscription .. . Foucault robs the body of agency . .. the body does
not act in and on the world; rather, the body is docile . .. a product of
the play of power . . . [even appearances of freedom are] a reflex of
domination. 145
Another issue with the Derridean ideal of hospitality as a tool of
emancipatory liberal politics is that it is paradoxically demanding and
obfuscating. Considering the magnitude of the task asked of us (accepting
outliers without reducing their otherness to manageable categories by
attempting to identify her), practically minded ethicists may lament the
lack of unequivocal guidance to operationalize it. A general disposition to
have a meaningful encounter with others is in fact the point of departure of
many moral theories, may it be based on moral attitudes like love,
concern, respect, or care, or on a recognition of other agents' priceless
worth. While intuitively plausible at a high level of abstraction, the
principle of limitless welcome seems to govern only the moment of
welcoming alterity in our midst.
Similar criticisms are not unknown to legal scholarship. Critical legal
scholars' radical attacks of liberalism are sometimes criticized for resting
on muddled ontologiesi" while practitioners may be concerned by the
lack of concrete guidance resulting from deconstructing and denouncing
arbitrary legal structures and relations of power.
An obvious response to such criticisms is that not all moral insights
translate into unambiguously specifiable policies, nor should they, and that
we should focus on what the ideal of absolute hospitality can do for us
rather than criticizing it for failing to deliver specific political
prescriptions it never meant to offer. The principle of limitless welcome
can have a positive role to play within amendments to liberal theories of
justice and legislative and judicial endeavours to foster equality even if its
nature prevents it from being articulated as a fixed norm within the legal
order.
Cressida Heyes also reports that "[p]roponents of identity politics have
suggested that poststructuralism is politically impotent, capable only of
deconstruction and never of action". Traditional liberals, on the other
hand, are criticized for being blind to ideology and social context, in a way
145. Bill Hughes, What Can a Foucauldian Analysis Contribute to Disability Theory? in
FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABLITY 85-87 (Shelley Tremain ed., 2015).
146. ANDREw ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).
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that leads them to extend a protection to the Other that reaffirms the
oppressive hierarchy that constituted it as an Other in the first place.'4 7
Beyond name-calling, those accusations gesture at a real, unavoidable
issue: If we take seriously the tools that our political system gives us to
help the marginalized and the powerless, we simultaneously implicitly
endorse and reinforce the ideology underlying the efficaciousness of said
tools. One must try to strike an unsteady balance by remaining alert to the
oppressive dimensions of an ideology that is also the vehicle of the
desirable values that one wishes to promote. Liberal and post-structuralist
insights seem to confer some steadiness to the funambulist legal scholar
walking this wavery line, even though they stand at the opposites ends of
the pole balancing them. Certainly, the aforementioned post-structuralist
reflections on the exclusionary characteristics of the legal order show that
both schools share surprisingly compatible intuitions on the need to
respond morally to PWD. This proper moral response would not only
welcome by assimilating, but also by accepting to change one's self and
community, and being disposed to endure the risks associated with such,
changes.
That said, the comparisons I am drawing between these scholarships
engaged in substantially different enterprises (or my suggestion that
liberals could add post-structuralist insights to their emancipatory toolkit)
could be criticized for doing too much or too little. My survey would
either accomplish too little if I am only juxtaposing a few thoughts that
liberals and their critics seem to share, or it would be too ambitious if it
suggests that Derridean or Foucauldian concepts can be integrated to
liberalism without being essentially denatured in the process. Liberal
scholarship (focused on refining egalitarian projects and ensuring
individual freedom) and post-structuralist or critical legal scholarship
(focused on criticizing such projects) operate within two different modes
of thought and pursue different projects. Liberals make use of a political
language that critiques of liberalism systematically problematize.
Liberalism and post-structuralism are obviously strange bedfellows.
However, I have endeavoured to show that a Foucauldian sensibility to
genealogies of power and a Derridean sensibility to radical otherness is
able to inform the extra- or proto-legal considerations confronting legal
actors committed to liberal ideals. Moreover, liberal scholars and
practitioners are open to amending their legal frameworks and theories
when they detect unfair uses of power within them or realize that current
norms unwittingly reinforce unfair structures. Critics of the liberal
enterprise may respond that even such amendments have fundamental
limitations since they ultimately rest on a tradition that encompasses
147. Cressida Heyes, Identity Politics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016 Edition),
E. N. Zalta (ed.), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/surn20l6/entries/identity-politics/.
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ideological elements that necessarily exclude alternative worldviews.
Liberals are constrained by the boundaries of the tradition they work at
revising, whereas critical thinkers are devoted to emphasizing how those
revisions reproduce oppressive structures or constitute new forms of
disciplinary or regulatory power. Nonetheless, let me, in the penultimate
Part, show that legal actors already engage with a self-critical mode of
thinking that is not dissimilar to the post-structuralist insights mentioned
before. Those self-critical ideas, by their very nature, may never be fully
entrenched in the structure that they aim at criticizing. Mainstream efforts
to integrate the "abnormal" are also bound up with, and limited by, the
idiom of equality and liberty, the twin values at the heart of mainstream
liberalism. They nonetheless contribute to the judicial interpretation of
legal concepts and to the outlook of scholars whose work "dredg[es] up
the suppressed alternatives [to existing legal conceptions, frameworks and
rules] and detail[s] the devices employed in their suppression." 4 8 I will
illustrate this claim with the treatment of the concept of equality.
IV. THE EVOLVING FACES OF EQUALITY
Sheila McIntyre writes: "When equality claims are really substantive,
they should challenge privileged understandings of the world and
privileged players' understanding of themselves."1 4 9 Legal scholars are
well aware that equality involves not only asking whether, within a given
framework (including legal, regulatory or political structures), goods are
being "equally" distributed, but also whether the framework itself meets
the requirements of "substantive equality." In other words, it is not enough
for social actors to ask what goods society should redistribute, and how
this distribution should proceed. The social structures (and the relations of
power and domination underlying them) within which this redistribution
takes place must itself be scrutinized, or else, they may provide a refuge
for harmful ideologies and deep inequalities to hide and insidiously govern
social arrangements, unchecked.`0
This reflection may open the door to a worry that the struggle to achieve
equality may be an infinite, unachievable, task. The pursuit of equality
would follow this order: as a first step, we would look for formal
inequalities in the distribution of goods (i.e. whether everyone receives the
same). Then, we would look for substantive inequalities (i.e. whether
148. Gordon, supra note 92, at 338.
149. Sheila McIntyre, Answering the Siren Call of Abstract Formalism with the Subjects and
Verbs of Domination, in MAKING EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL 108 (Faraday, Denike & Stevenson eds.,
2009).
150. This position is compellingly articulated in IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990) and is not foreign to equality law: the Supreme Court of Canada has
expressed similar ideas in its treatment of systemic discrimination in Canadian National Railway
Company Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) [1987] 1 SCR 1114, at 1134-43.
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everyone equally benefits, or is being equally considered, by the existing
distributive scheme, considering that individuals may benefit from a same
good in different ways). While the first step would only reflect a formal
sense of equality, the second one would reflect a more substantive sense of
equality. The second step would question whether we were truly paying
equal consideration to all when we were considering giving the same to
everyone. Our quest for substantive equality may then require not only
that we pay attention to the diversity of human needs without
discriminating against anyone on the basis of prejudice, but also that we
inspect whether the very distributive institutions in place are not structured
in such a way that they systematically favour some social groups or
individuals over others. This third step would be associated with a
systemic analysis of inequality. It is fair to say that social justice scholars
deplore that, in practice, courts and policy-makers have not fully
developed the conceptual tools (such as "positive rights" and "systemic
discrimination") that would enable them to fully achieve this third step."5
The worry that our quest for substantive equality requires infinite, and
therefore perhaps futile, work, is based on the hypothesis that inequalities
will then hide in any corrective structures or corrective theories that will
be put in place. And once these corrective meta-structures are scrutinized,
inequalities (based on harmful ideologies and relations of power) will
further retreat when any additional scrutinizing process is used, or any
corrective meta-meta-structures it gives birth to. If liberal endeavors to
achieve equality are susceptible to be appropriated as tools of power by
dominant groups or as ways to discipline physically or mentally different
bodies, can the liberal ideal of substantive equality ever be accomplished?
The moderately good news is that the sense in which this quest may
never be accomplished may not matter so much as to make liberal
endeavors meaningless. Dominant groups may and probably will subvert
(if not create) legal apparatuses meant to pursue equality. A Foucauldian
taking his distance from a Marxist understanding of power as ideological
would make a similar point by saying that such new apparatuses will be
used in controlling individual bodies and populations. Liberal legal
scholarship cannot devise a way to shield their legislative and judicial
efforts to advance a commitment to the ideal of substantive equality from
ideology or biopower once and for all. The concern that moral agents or
collectivities may be the unwitting puppets of ideologies should not
paralyze liberals. Before giving in to Foucauldian fatalism by noting that
legal actors cannot stand up to power because power pervades their every
"actions and attitudes, their discourses, leaning processes and everyday
151. MAKING EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL: SECURING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY UNDER THE
CHARTER (F. Faraday, M. Denike & M. K. Stephenson eds., 2009); POVERTY: RIGHTS, SOCIAL
CITIZENSHIP, AND LEGAL ACTIVISM (M. Young, S. B. Boyd, G. Brodsky & S. Day eds., 2007).
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lives,"l52 , one may remember Derrida's encouraging note that justice is
always "yet to come". Assuming that the subversive discourses and
actions of disability scholars and activists are meaningful acts in pursuit of
freedom, a critical outlook can prompt liberals to probe their equality-
enhancing policies for ideological biases and questionable forms of
control over differently embodied individuals or deterministic assumptions
about them, instead of abandoning equality policies and rights altogether.
Ableist prejudices are susceptible to endure in the systemic confines of our
democracies, but we would already partially cut off their retreat by
capturing their direct and indirect manifestations, as well as by
scrutinizing relational structures fostering more insidious, less detectable,
forms of inequalities.
Social justice scholars may not spend much time lamenting about the
senses in which this "achievement" is never perfected, but they are
certainly aware that their strategies for overcoming discrimination and
achieving recognition of neurological and cultural diversity must evolve
contextually to remain relevant. In the first case concerning the
constitutional rights to equality before the Supreme Court of Canada,
Justice McIntyre acknowledged that "in human affairs . . . all that can be
expected" is to "approach the [admittedly unattainable] ideal of full
equality before and under the law". This involves:
Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal
characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among those
subject to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be
possible, an equality of benefit and protection and no more of the
restrictions, penalties or burdens imposed upon one than another.153
Legal actors cannot afford to shy away from ideals only because they
are unattainable or because both their shape and the means to pursue them
evolve along with our culture and the power dynamics within it. Evolving
conceptions of disability have the potential to challenge the boundaries of
our community, just like conceptions of equality, freedom of expression
and other liberties were utilized in emancipatory struggles. Nothing, in
principle, prevents courts, activists and legislators from harnessing the
subversive potential of disability conceptions by uncovering the processes
that construct them and by expanding legal definitions, frameworks and
doctrines that make use of them.
The multiplication and strategic uses of different models of disability
under the Americans with Disability Act,154 the Canadian Charter of
152. Hughes, supra note 145, at 86 (citing Michel Foucault's The Eye ofPower).
153. Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia, [ 1989] 1 SCR 143, 65.
154. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 213 (2000).
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Rights and Freedom, 1' and the 2006 United Nations' Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities all illustrate this possibility. For
instance, the latter instrument integrates the conceptions of "disability"
both as a universal human feature and as a stigmatized minority identity
marker. Those rights point to potentially conflicting paradigms, but
whether or not this tension can or will be worked out, it provides a point of
pressure for understandings of substantive equality to evolve. 5 6
"Disability", similarly to "equality", is both a difficult concept to pin
down and an important one to pursue the ends of liberal justice. The term
"disability" is often used to denote abnormality, but it could equally be
used to criticize society's expectations of normalcy. A simplified post-
structuralist ethical prescription derived from the second part of this article
is that no model of disability can definitively exempt society from a
collective duty to remain alert to the continuing mutation of the category
of social and biological phenomena currently denoted by conceptions of
"disability." This aspiration to remain receptive to new manifestations of
alterity and new ways of constructing outliers is far from a bleeding heart
truism. Anyone familiar with the harms commonly endured by disabled
people facing legal and social arrangements that ignore their particular
needs and capabilities should apprehend its moral weight. The quote from
Frid6ric Othon Th6odore Aristid~s in the epigraph of this Article is taken
from his parable, L 'histoire du corbac aux baskets (The Story of the Crow
that Wore Sneakers). In this graphic novel, Fred depicts the story of Mr.
Corbackobasket ("Mr. Crowsneakers"), a crow that consults a psychiatrist
and relates how troublesome his life is in a world of human beings. As the
treatment draws to a close, he loses his feathers and becomes human
again, only to find that everyone around him, including his psychiatrist,
have now become crows, and keep ostracizing him for being different.
One of the lessons this parable teaches is that (ab)normalcy and
(dis)ability undergo social mutations so that any particular legal
accommodation trying to protect today's outlier or monster would miss the
point that tomorrow's outlier or monster will have a different face.
V. CONCLUSION
Disability has often been, and still is, used to discuss and deal with the
Other that defines the Self, the scraps of paper on the floor after the paper-
doll chain has been cut out. In that sense, disability can be approached
philosophically not as an effort to understand a peculiar category of
155. Mary Ann McColl, People with Disabilities and the Charter, 5 CAN. J. DISABILITY STUD.
(2016).
156. On the divergence between those two particular models, see Jerome E. Bickenbach,
Minority Rights or Universal Participation: The Politics of Disablement, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-
ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE (M. Jones & L. A. Marks eds., 1999).
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beings, but as an effort to understand the being who cannot be what human
beings are "supposed" to be: the person who cannot fit normal modes of
production, reproduction, political and social participation, or a variety of
other roles that are assumed, when normally performed, to give meaning
to a human life. The child who cannot grow up. The grown-up who cannot
have a child. The absolutely disabled person is the person who has nothing
but personhood in common with us, and by personhood, I only mean here
a sense - generally anchored in a shared humanity - that this individual
belongs to our community. The fact that the "disabled person" belongs to
our community and simultaneously cannot be controlled, rewarded,
punished, or moulded into social roles like most people makes her a
disquieting other in our midsts, demanding us to live with our intolerable
failure to integrate her, to change the shape of our community to better
welcome her, or to exclude her from, or isolate her within, this
community. Thus radically put, disability defies the well-meaning
integrationist agenda of liberals seeking to normalize PWD, for disability
would be defined, in its core, by abnormalcy or that which resists
sameness. Normalizing strategies would not accommodate radical
otherness: they would eliminate it.
By contrast, a mainstream liberal outlook on disability does not
understand this concept as denoting the inherent limits or failures of
liberalism as traditionally understood. It sees disability as a more
manageable issue that liberalism is supposed to fix or dissolve. However,
not all instances of "disability" can or should be solved. First, the term
"disability" may denote a process that construct otherness rather than a
medical phenomenon. Second, not all disabilities have a negative value
and ought to be cured, through new technologies or otherwise.' Certain
senses of disability may come to pass, as ideals of universal design
become more widespread, and as disability comes to denote a fact of
human societies rather than an essentialized category of people. Other,
new, senses of "disability", however, may appear as the norm of "that
which we ought to strive to become" shifts and evolves along the figures
of the "disabled", the differently embodied (and other marginalized
figures, such as the "freak", the "monster", the "stranger", the
"scapegoat", etc.) shaped by their inability to inhabit our socially
constructed world and society's unwillingness to construct a more
hospitable world.
The philosophy of disability can help legal scholarship to deal with the
evolving landscape of disability phenomena. In spite of being nourished
by very different schools, disability theorists generally favor the social
157. ELIZABETH BARNES, THE MINORITY BODY: A THEORY OF DISABILITY, ch. 2 (2016).
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integration of PWD.'" This shared ideal suggests that even disability
theorists working from within diverging methodologies and modes of
thought may learn from one another. While mainstream liberal theories of
justice are concerned with responding to differences respectfully and
fairly, philosophers of disability can help articulate the nature of
differences and what constitutes a fair response to them. Certain criticisms
of our liberal ideology must inevitably exist outside of a liberal
framework, just like the inherent limitations of our legal order may not be
solved with legal tools. This does not mean that policymakers, activists,
legal actors and social justice scholars dealing with disability should not
endorse self-critical and hospitable dispositions. Nor does it mean that
moral recommendations incompatible with liberalism should not be taken
seriously, even though our current institutions have trouble
accommodating them.
The philosophy of disability does not only have the potential to support
civil rights struggles by supplementing theories of identity politics,
discrimination and equality, now already integrated, though constantly
negotiated, within our law. (To use the crow-turned-man parable: it can do
more than assimilate PWD in a way that fails to deal with how
problematic assimilationist strategies are in the first place.) It also has the
potential to further destabilize barely explored and challenged assumptions
about the human embodiment of the legal subject, as currently conceived
in mainstream legal and political thought. It is at work, concretely
speaking, when policy-makers and legal scholars re-imagine the legal
subject's capacities and entitlements and the kind of social interactions
the state should foster. "If disabled people were truly heard," Susan
Wendell wrote, "an explosion of knowledge of the human body and
psyche would take place." 9
This article examined various strands within disability theory, many of
which capitalize on this subversive potential. While "first wave" disability
theorists define disability as oppression, "second wave" disability theorists
characterize disability as a cluster of phenomena that "evade classification
by refusing to stay in place . . . always liminal, transgressive and
transformative."" Understood as a liminal legal concept (in the vicinity
of Foucault's "monster" or Derrida's "absolute arrivant"), disability is
paradoxically a threat and an ally to mainstream liberal scholarship and
158. This include philosophers of disability who are critical of terms like "social integration" or
"social inclusion" because they take it to mean assimilation. I mean "integration" in a sense broad
enough to encompass any more empowering visions they may have of means for PWD to claim their
own subjectivity. One may also share Foucault's understanding of power and reject this ideal for being
too optimistic and hold instead that discourses about "social integration" are doomed to complicity
reinforce the structure that constructed "disabled people" and casted them out of the legal order in the
first place.
159. Wendell, supra note 28 at 120.
160. SHILDRICK, supra note 61 at 9.
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the legal practices it informs. On the one hand, its lessons profoundly
disturb the bases upon which liberals hope to achieve equality and
freedom. On the other, it invites liberals to perpetually refine their agenda
of social integration without which equality and freedom would be illusory
for many of us.
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